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1Chapter 1
General Introduction
This dissertation contains three essays in industrial organisation. Chapter 2 analyses
Þrms incentives to preannounce innovations when consumers have costs of switching
from one product to another. Chapter 3 deals with the emergence and consequences
of price leadership in two different industry settings. And chapter 4 investigates the
interaction between Þrms R&D decisions and locational choices.
Each chapter is an independent piece of work, and can be read separately. The
chapters contain their own introduction that raises the issues studied, relates them to
the literature in the area, and highlights the contributions made. Here, I will therefore
conÞne myself to provide the reader a short outline of each essay of this thesis.
In many markets consumers who have previously purchased from one Þrm have costs
of switching to a competitors product. These switching costs imply that especially
in industries with fast technological progress buyers are confronted with an intertem-
poral trade-off between buying the presently available technology with the risk of
economic obsolescence due to the arrival of an innovation and waiting for the new
technology without locking into the old one. In Chapter 2 we study the incentives
of innovating Þrms to preannounce new technologies in order to increase the expected
value of waiting for consumers. In particular, we will point out that this kind of ad-
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vance information might not always be entirely beneÞcial for innovators. Announcing
a new developed product might help to prevent the lock-in of potential customers
into the old technology before the launch of the new product. But, at the same time,
the information about future entry spills over to the incumbent Þrm and gives it the
opportunity to take preemptive actions against the innovative Þrm. In this work we
want to show how this trade-off inßuences the preannouncement behaviour of inno-
vative entrants and derive conditions under which preannouncements are more likely
to be observed. The welfare analysis of the model is supposed to give us indications
for a sensible competition policy regarding innovation announcements.
For this purpose we make use of a two period model of vertical product differentiation
with overlapping consumer generations and analyse intertemporal consumer choice
under uncertainty and imperfect competition in the product market.
To sum up, we Þnd that innovative Þrms may not always have an incentive to pre-
announce a new product generation. They might prefer not to inform their potential
future clientele in order to avoid the information spillover and a tug-of-war with
the incumbent. In this vein, preannouncements are more likely in industries where
the innovation step of the new technology is relatively high, the time between an-
nouncement and launch is short and consumers are not to heterogenous. The welfare
analysis shows that, from the point of view of the consumers, there might be too few
or too many announcements and depending on the characteristics of the industry,
announcement bans or enforcements might improve on the free market outcome.
Chapter 3 contains two duopolistic models that challenge commonly held views on
the emergence and consequences of endogenous price leadership in industries. In the
Þrst part, we investigate again an industry with vertical product differentiation. In
particular, we analyse the typical two stage setting in which Þrms Þrst set qualities
and then engage in price competition. But instead of assuming simultaneous choices
we endogenise the timing in the price game and explicitly allow price leadership to
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emerge. In a Þrst step, we demonstrate that price leadership is actually the equilib-
rium outcome of the second stage with the high-quality Þrm as the industry leader.
More interestingly, the emergence of price leadership affects the quality choices in the
Þrst stage of the game. That means, Þrms anticipate that price leadership reduces
the intensity of price competition in the short run and this gives the low-quality Þrm
a stronger incentive to decrease product differentiation and to invest more in quality.
By consequence, price leadership leads to higher prices for given qualities but it also
implies a higher average product quality in the industry. Taken together, we can show
that in this sense price leadership can actually be beneÞcial for consumers and hurt
Þrms in the overall game.
In the second part of this chapter, we reconsider a model by Deneckere and Kovenock
and Lee (1992) who study incentives for price leadership in markets with consumers
switching costs. Previous studies have demonstrated that when one identiÞes Þrm
size with capacity then price leadership of the large Þrm should arise because the
smaller Þrm stands to lose more by moving Þrst and being undercut from its rival.
Deneckere et al. argue that the same holds true if one measures Þrms size with the size
of a Þrms locked-in customer base. The model presented in Chapter 3 demonstrates
that this claim crucially hinges on the size of switching costs for the consumers. In
particular, they suppose that switching costs are prohibitive, i.e. once a consumer
has bought a Þrms product she can not switch afterwards. We relax this assumption
and show that for positive but Þnite consumers switching costs the opposite result
holds. In contrast to their model, here the large Þrm stands to lose a lot if it leads and
is undercut by its rival since in our model consumers can switch and the incentive to
cut prices for the small Þrm is the larger, the bigger the base of its rival. In addition
to this, the follower role makes the large Þrm tame since it would have to apply any
price cut to his large customer base. Anticipating this, the small Þrm is willing to
move Þrst and this coincidence of incentives gives rise to situations in which one Þrm
strictly prefers to lead while the other one strictly prefers to follow. Interestingly,
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our welfare considerations indicate that over a large range of the parameter space the
endogenously determined price leadership pattern maximises social welfare.
Finally, inChapter 4, which is joint work with Thomas Rønde and Konrad Stahl, we
investigate the interaction between Þrms R&D decisions and their location choices
in product and/or geographical space. In the vein of the seminal paper of Hotelling
(1929) Þrms location choices follow the trade-off between two by now standard ef-
fects: a demand effect that induces the individual Þrm to move towards the center
of the market, and a competition effect that drives the Þrms away from each other.
It was Hotellings belief that the former is stronger and Þrms tend to supply identi-
cal products. However, dAspremont and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) showed Þfty
years later that Hotellings analysis was wrong and that for symmetric product qual-
ities and quadratic transportation costs, the principle of maximum differentiation
holds, i.e. the competition effect always dominates the market effect.
In our benchmark model, we introduce stochastic R&D in the Hotelling framework
and show that this can restore Hotellings initial result even in a model with quadratic
transportation costs of consumers. The intuition for this result is that if market entry
(or product quality) depends on the stochastic outcome of Þrms R&D activities, a
Þrm meets a successful competitor in the product market only with a certain probabil-
ity. This weakens the competition effect while the demand effect remains unchanged.
In modiÞcations of this benchmark model we look at the impact of R&D spillovers
and patent protection on Þrms location choices and show that the former has a
deglomerating effect while the latter has an agglomerating effect.
In the second part of this work, we extend our framework and allow Þrms to choose
their R&D technology together with their location. More speciÞcally, Þrms can adopt
either a safe R&D project yielding a low-quality product or a risky project aiming at
a large innovation step. We show that for a large range of the parameter space the
following three types of equilibria can emerge. Either Þrms choose dispersed locations
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and adopt the safe R&D technology. Or, they agglomerate in the center and one of the
Þrms opts for the risky technologies. Or, Þnally, they agglomerate and both choose
the risky R&D technology. This result hints at a strong complementarity between
risk taking in R&D and geographical concentration of Þrms. Finally, our welfare
analysis gives a rather diverse picture. There may be excessive differentiation and
concentration in product space and too less or too much risk taking in the choice of
the R&D technology.
References
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6Chapter 2
Innovation Preannouncement in a
Vertically Differentiated Industry
2.1 Introduction
In industries with consumers switching costs and fast technological progress, buy-
ers face an intertemporal choice between subsequent product generations. Buying
the presently available product entails the risk of early economic obsolescence due
to an immediately afterwards upcoming innovation. This potential lock-in has to be
traded off with the expected cost of waiting for a better technology. Product pre-
announcements are an appropriate and widely observed strategy for innovating Þrms
to increase the expected value of waiting for the consumers and prevent the loss of
potential future demand. For example, Volkswagen announced the arrival of its new
beetle car three years in advance and one year before its availability, they already had
70.000 orders from waiting customers.
Nevertheless, such advance communications may not always be entirely beneÞcial to
the innovative Þrm. Although they are directed to inform potential customers, the
message will obviously reach incumbent competitors, too. And as many markets with
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fast technological progress are dominated by Þrms with a certain degree of temporary
market power, strategic interaction is most probable as the following examples from
the video game market demonstrates.
In 1988, Sega introduced its 16-bit-Mega Drive home video system which was at
that time a large innovation step beyond the existing 8-bit systems. They sold the
console for $190 and games were priced between $40 and $70. Nintendo, Segas closest
competitor, reacted and gave its customers a reason to wait by preannouncing their
own new 16-bit system. As an immediate response to this, Sega started offering their
system in bundle with one game for $150. One year later, Nintendo entered the
market and soon prices dropped under $100.1
The 32-bit generation of game consoles was announced by the new entrant Sony in
1994. The year before its actual launch in 1995 was the poorest in terms of sales
Þgures of the whole industry history because consumers were waiting for the new
technology to arrive.2
Finally, in the end of 1995, Nintendo announced the launch of its 64-bit console
machine in autumn 1996. From the day of the announcement until its introduction
the prices of Segas and Sonys 32-bit systems dropped from $299 to $149.3
Another well-known and well-reported preannouncement story, the Control Data anti-
trust case in 1967 is another example for the severity of strategic reactions. The
sales of the computer manufacturer Control Data suffered tremendously when IBM
announced the arrival of its new and largely superior System/360 model in 1964 which
was Þnally not available before 1967. But the immense price cuts that Control Data
had to offer to attract customers, induced them to bring an anti-trust charge against
IBM.4
1For more details see Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996), p. 237-242.
2see Power games, Marketing Week: London; May 19, 1995.
3see Sony and Sega plan price cuts to torpedo Nintendo 64 launch, Marketing Week : London;
July 26, 1996.
4Fisher and McGowan and Greenwood (1985) devote a whole book to the IBM/Control Data
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With the use of preannouncements, Þrms can retain customers from buying substitute
products and thus preserve their own potential demand until the period of product
introduction. At the same time, as the examples above show, this advance informa-
tion spills over to the incumbent competitor and gives him the opportunity for an
additional strategic move before the innovative Þrms entry.
The aim of the present paper is to analyse the strategic role of innovation prean-
nouncements in an imperfectly competitive market setting. It will be shown how the
described trade-off affects the announcement behaviour of an innovative Þrm in the
context of a vertically differentiated market with overlapping consumer generations.
We analyse situations in which the preannouncement of a new, superior technology
by an outside Þrm gives the incumbent monopolist incentives for preemptive price
cuts in the pre-entry period in order to attract consumers before the availability of
the new product. The main results can be summarised as follows. The probability
that an innovating Þrm will preannounce its product is high, if
 the innovation step beyond the existing technology is sufficiently large,
 time between preannouncement and launch is short (or the consumers are im-
patient),
 the average consumers valuation for quality is rather low and/or
 consumers are more heterogeneous with respect to their valuation of quality.
At a Þrst glance, the welfare results of the model are somewhat surprising. From
the consumers point of view, the market can produce too few or too many pre-
announcements. While the under-provision of information seems obvious given a
preemptive reaction by an incumbent, the over-provision result stems from the con-
sumers trade-off between efficient information transmission and market contestabil-
ity. Preannouncements of new products entail efficient information transmission and
case taking place between 1960 and 1980.
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an efficient matching between consumers and product generations over time. How-
ever, with the entrants use of preannouncements, markets lose the threat of entry in
periods when there is no innovation and the incumbent regains market power. We
show that consumers would prefer a ban on preannouncements in situations in which
the upcoming innovation step is of an intermediate size and ex ante expectations
about its introduction are rather high.
The previous work dealing with preannouncements of strategies mainly analyses prob-
lems related to commitment effects. Henkel (1996) studies games in which in an
announcement stage each player commits partly to a strategy. The degree of commit-
ment is endogenous and individually chosen and later deviation from the announce-
ment is costly. The author Þnds that in the case of strategic complements in the basic
game the introduction of the announcement stage induces the players to commit partly
and thus supports collusion. Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that announcements
without any direct inßuence on the payoffs (cheap talk) can be relevant in games
with private information. Farrell (1987) does the same for games in which there is a
coordination problem.
The present paper departs from this strand of literature with the somewhat extreme
assumption that the preannouncement of the innovation is fully credible, i.e. the
innovative Þrm can perfectly commit to timing and quality of the new product. In
other words, we completely abstract from any kind of untruthful preannouncement
that might lead to vaporware-products. We think that this is appropriate since
it allows us to concentrate on the strategic reaction effect of preannouncements
without affecting the qualitative nature of our results (see the last section for a further
discussion).
With this assumption, our work is much closer to some other studies. Farrell and
Saloner (1985) analyse the effect of preannouncements on the adoption of a new
incompatible good in the presence of network externalities. In this context, pre-
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announcements make the adoption of the new technology more likely which can be
socially desirable. A major drawback of their model is that it does not consider strate-
gic pricing but assumes a competitive supply of the old and the new technology. Yin
(1995) presents a study, in which an innovating Þrm can announce the quality of its
product early or late. Delaying the announcement means that the competitor has
to set its own quality on the basis of the distribution of the possible innovation out-
comes. In this model, the innovator has no incentive to announce early and the results
are straightforward: Although the early announcement policy is socially desirable, it
is not supported in equilibrium. Gerlach (1999) analyses the preannouncement be-
haviour of a monopolist. Announcing a superior technology cannibalises the present
sales of the old technology if consumers have some kind of switching costs. The author
shows that monopolists may have an incentive not to preannounce in order to make
consumers buy the old and switch to the new product afterwards. Furthermore, this
work analyses the rationale behind vaporware, i.e. products that are announced
although they will knowingly not be available at the promised date.
Our work also relates to the literature on information exchange among Þrms and
their impact on competition. Kühn and Vives (1995) provide quite general conditions
including the type of competition and the nature of uncertainty under which Þrms
have an incentive to share information about cost or demand. The scenario that comes
closest to our model is Bertrand competition with private value cost uncertainty in
which Þrms typically have no incentives to share information with their competitor. In
our framework, however, innovations are preannounced because Þrm want to inßuence
consumers decisions.
The organisation of the paper is along the dynamic structure of the presented game-
theoretical model starting from backwards. The following section presents the basic
assumptions of the model. Section 2.3 is devoted to the price quilibria in the second
period in the case with and without an innovation. In section 2.4 we look at the
Þrst period pricing behaviour of the incumbent and the purchase decision of the
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consumers. The following two sections respectively analyse the preannouncement
behaviour of the innovating Þrm and its welfare implications. Finally, section 2.7
concludes with the discussion of the proposed framework, some robustness checks
and possible extensions. Note that all proofs are delegated to the appendix.
2.2 The Model
We consider a simple two period model of a vertically differentiated industry in the
spirit of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983). In
every period, t = 1, 2, a cohort of consumers who only differ in their taste for quality
θ, will enter the market. Though the valuation of a consumer is only known to
himself, it is common knowledge that the taste parameter is uniformly distributed
on [a − h, a + h]. The parameter a can be interpreted as the average valuation of
consumers for quality, while h reßects the degree of heterogeneity of the consumer
population. We normalise the mass of consumers in each cohort to 1 and we will
submit the distribution parameters to the following restriction:
a ≥ 5h. (2.1)
This condition states that consumers tastes are not too heterogeneous with respect
to the average valuation of the population and it ensures us covered market equilibria
in both periods. In the considered time span, every consumer can afford to buy at
most one unit of the durable good. This means for cohort 1 consumers that switching
from a product they bought in the Þrst period to another in period 2 is prohibitively
costly.
On the supply side, we consider two Þrms, an incumbent monopolist, referred to as
Þrm 1, and a potentially innovating outside Þrm 2. While the incumbent offers in both
periods product 1 of quality q1, Þrm 2 conducts R&D to develop a superior technology.
This innovation process is stochastic, though the R&D investment decision is not
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explicitly modelled. With probability ρ0, the next step on an imaginary quality
ladder is done and the resulting product is of a given quality q2 > q1. In the no
innovation event (with probability 1 − ρ0), the only available quality is q1, which
prevents Þrm 2 from entering the market as there is some small entry cost ε > 0.
For simplicity, both Þrms are assumed to produce at zero marginal costs. Firms and
consumers have rational expectations, are risk neutral and discount future revenues
using discount factors 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 per period. Finally, it will be convenient to use
∆ ≡ q2−q1
q1
as a measure for the size of the upcoming innovation step.
Innovation 
with
probability ρ0
New cohort and 
waiting consumers 
can buy q1, (q2) 
or not at all
Consumer cohort
enters market,
buy q1, or wait
Incumbent firm 1
offers q1 at price p
Introduction of
new product q2
if available
Innovative firm 2
decides about
preannouncement
t=0 t=1 t=2
Figure 2.1: Time Structure of the Model.
The time structure of the model is as follows (cf. Figure 2.1). Before period 0, nature
moves and Þrm 2 succeeds with probability ρ0 in developing the new product which
can be introduced to the market as soon as period 2.5 In this case, Þrm 2 can decide
whether to preannounce the product or not.6 In period 1, the incumbent Þrm offering
a product of quality q1 and the Þrst cohort consumers use the preannouncement signal
to update their prior beliefs and form expectations about the market outcome in
5Think of the delay as the time for testing the product, preparing mass production and negotiate
distribution channels.
6Notice that, this choice is only to be made in the innovation subgame since in this simple two
period framework, untruthful preannouncements make no sense for Þrm 2. See the last section for
a discussion of this assumption.
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period 2. After the incumbent monopolist has set a price p, consumers can either
purchase good q1 in t = 1, or wait for the second period. In period t = 2, two
constellations are possible. If there is no innovation to be introduced, Þrm 1 keeps on
selling the old product at a price pM1 . Otherwise, if Þrm 2 launches the innovation,
we have a duopolistic market in which Þrms simultaneously set their prices pD1 and
pD2 , respectively. Finally, the waiting Þrst cohort and the entering second cohort
consumers can buy product q1, q2 (if available) or not all (the value of the outside
option is normalised to 0). In order to keep matters as simple as possible, we exclude
transactions via a resale market and any depreciation of the durable good.
With these assumptions, a consumer θ, who buys product q1 in period 1, derives an
overall net utility of
U11(θ) ≡ θq1 − p+ δθq1, (2.2)
where Uij denotes the total net utility of consuming product i in period 1 and j in
period 2. The expected net utility of waiting (this Þrst period option is denoted by
0) and buying either product q1 or q2 in period 2 is
E[U0(θ)] ≡ δρ Max{θq1 − pD1 , θq2 − pD2 }+ δ(1− ρ)(θq1 − pM1 ). (2.3)
We will look for Perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game and start our analysis by
looking at the second period market outcome taking into consideration the Þrst cohort
consumers that decided to wait. Then we turn to the Þrst period and assume that
the market participants rationally anticipate the future market constellations. In the
case of an innovation announcement, priors are updated to one and there is complete
certainty about the upcoming launch of a new product. If there is no announcement,
beliefs can also be reconsidered since no communication can mean that either there
is no innovation or that it is not proÞtable for the Þrm to preannounce it. Finally,
we look at the announcement decision of the innovating Þrm who rationally expects
the behaviour of her competitor and the consumers.
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2.3 Second Period
In the last period, the entering second cohort consumers join the waiting Þrst cohort
consumers which results in some aggregate distribution function. As it will turn out
in the next section, we can conÞne ourselves to two possible outcomes. Throughout
the paper, we will refer to the situation in which low-valuation consumers in the
interval [a− h, x], with a − h ≤ x ≤ a + h, decide to wait as constellation I. The
aggregate consumer density function in the second period is then simply
faggI (θ, x) ≡
 2 if a− h ≤ θ ≤ x,1 if x < θ ≤ a+ h.
In constellation II, high-valuation consumers in [y, a+ h], with a − h ≤ y < a + h,
stay in the market until period 2, which results in
faggII (θ, y) ≡
 1 if a− h ≤ θ ≤ y,2 if y < θ ≤ a+ h,
Given these two possible consumer populations (x or y are endogenously determined
in the Þrst period), we have to consider two possible market structures depending on
the success of the R&D activity of Þrm 2. If the new product is not available, Þrm 1
keeps its monopolistic position and offers a product of quality q1 at a price p1. As the
second period net utility of a consumer θ is given by θq1 − p1, the consumer who is
indifferent between buying and the outside option of value 0 is at p1
q1
.With a consumer
population given by faggI (θ, x), the monopolist faces a second period demand
DMI (p1, x) ≡

(x− (a− h)) + 2h if p1 ≤ (a− h)q1,
(x− p1
q1
) + (a+ h− p1
q1
) if (a− h)q1 ≤ p1 ≤ xq1,
Min{a+ h− p1
q1
, 0} if p1 ≥ xq1.
For low prices the monopolist serves all or at least some of the waiting consumers.
If p1 > xq1 he only sells to cohort 2 consumers with a high valuation. The demand
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function is continuous, piecewise linear and convex since its slope in [(a − h)q1, xq1]
is higher than in the regime with p1 > xq1. These properties yield a proÞt function
p1D
M
I (p1, x) which may have two local maximisers. Nevertheless, it is straightforward
to show that the slope of the proÞt function is negative for all p1 ≥ (a− h)q1 as long
as a ≥ 3h (see proof of Lemma 1 in the appendix). Thus, we have
Lemma 1 Given demand DMI (p1, x) and for all a ≥ 3h, a monopolist offering a
product of quality q1, optimally chooses pM1 = (a − h)q1 and serves all consumers in
the market.
If the consumer population is given by faggII (θ, y), the demand function is
DMII (p1, y) ≡

(a+ h− y) + 2h if p1 ≤ (a− h)q1,
(a+ h− y) + (a+ h− p1
q1
) if (a− h)q1 ≤ p1 ≤ yq1,
Min{2(a+ h− p1
q1
), 0} if p1 ≥ yq1.
If the waiting consumers are on the upper end of the taste scale, the demand has a
piecewise linear but concave shape and incentives to set low prices become weaker
since they would have to be applied over a larger mass of high valuation consumers.
The corresponding proÞts are single-peaked and it can be shown that
Lemma 2 For all a ≥ 5h, a monopolist that faces DMII (p1, y) sets pM1 = (a − h)q1
and serves all consumers in the market.
The intuition for these two lemmas is straightforward. In Lemma 1, there is an addi-
tional mass of low valuation consumers that gives the monopolist a strong incentive
to decrease the price in order to serve all consumers. On contrary, if the bulk of
consumers is on the upper end of the taste scale, Þrm 1 is inclined to raise its price
and give up some of the low-valuation consumers. But as Lemma 2 shows, this is not
optimal as long as (2.1) holds.
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Let us now turn to the case in which the outside Þrm introduces the new product of
quality q2 in the second period and both Þrms play a simultaneous Nash equilibrium in
prices. As long as all consumers derive a positive net utility, the indifferent consumer
between buying q1 at p1 and q2 at p2 is at
p2−p1
q2−q1 . Consider Þrst a population f
agg
I (θ, x)
and denote the demand for Þrm 1 as DDI,1(p1, p2, x). For sufficiently low prices p1, Þrm
1 attracts all cohort 1 consumers and high valuation consumer of cohort 2. For higher
prices some waiting cohort 1 consumers start to switch to the high quality product.
DeÞne for notational convenience ∆q ≡ (q2 − q1) and ∆p ≡ (p2 − p1), then
DDI,1(p1, p2, x) =

(x− a+ h) + 2h if ∆p > (a+ h)∆q,
(x− a+ h) + (∆p
∆q
− a) if x∆q ≤ ∆p ≤ (a+ h)∆q,
Min{2(∆p
∆q
− a+ h), 0} if ∆p < x∆q.
Note again that this demand schedule is piecewise linear and concave because Þrm
1 serves with a relatively high price the high-density segment of the consumer dis-
tribution. The corresponding proÞts are therefore single-peaked and one gets Þve
candidate solutions to the proÞt maximisation problem given a price p2 of the high-
quality Þrm: three corner solutions and two interior solutions. Accordingly, the best
response function for Þrm 1, RDI,1(p2, x), consists of Þve parts
RDI,1(p2, x) =

0 if p2 ≤ ep1,
1
2
[p2 − (a− h)∆q] if ep1 ≤ p2 ≤ ep2,
p2 − x∆q if ep2 ≤ p2 ≤ ep3,
1
2
[p2 − (2a− 2h− x)∆q] if ep3 ≤ p2 ≤ ep4,
p2 − (a+ h)∆q if p2 > ep4,
with ep1 ≡ (a−h)∆q, ep2 ≡ (2x−a+h)∆q, ep3 ≡ (2a−2h−3x)∆q and ep4 ≡ (4h+x)∆q.
This reaction functions is continuous, piecewise linear and monotonically increasing
in p2.
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The demand of the high-quality Þrm faced with a consumer distribution faggI (θ, x) is
DDI,2(p1, p2, x) =

Min{(a+ h− ∆p
∆q
), 0} if ∆p > x∆q,
(x− ∆p
∆q
) + (a+ h− ∆p
∆q
) if (a− h)∆q ≤ ∆p ≤ x∆q,
(x− a+ h) + 2h if ∆p < (a− h)∆q.
This function is convex and the corresponding proÞt function can have two peaks.
Nevertheless, as long as a ≥ 3h, the marginal proÞts are negative for all p2 ≥ p1 +
(a− h)(q2 − q1). Thus, the best response function simpliÞes to
RDI,2(p1, x) = p1 + (a− h)(q2 − q1).
Solving for the Nash equilibrium, we get
Lemma 3 Consider a simultaneous price setting duopoly with a high quality Þrm q2,
a low quality Þrm q1 and the consumer population f
agg
I (θ, x) given above. For a ≥ 3h,
the unique Nash equilibrium in prices is given by pD1 = 0 and p
D
2 = (a − h)(q2 − q1).
The high-quality Þrm serves all consumers in the market.
This equilibrium with one active Þrm is mainly due to the assumption that the con-
sumers are not too heterogeneous with respect to the taste parameter. Additionally, if
the mass of low-valuation consumers is large, the Þrm with the high quality good has
an even stronger incentive to serve all consumers by driving the low-quality supplier
out of the market.
If Þrms are confronted with a faggII (θ, y) population, the respective demand function
of Þrm 1 is
DDII,1(p1, p2, y) =

(a+ h− y) + 2h if ∆p > (a+ h)∆q,
(∆p
∆q
− y) + (∆p
∆q
− a+ h) if (a+ h)∆q ≥ ∆p ≥ y∆q,
Min{(∆p
∆q
− a+ h), 0} if ∆p < y∆q.
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This convex demand schedule implies a proÞt function that has two peaks for certain
values of p2. And this is reßected in a discontinuity in the best response pattern of
Þrm 1:
RDII,1(p2, y) =

0 if p2 < ep1
1
2
[p2 − (a− h)∆q] if ep1 ≤ p2 ≤ ep5,
p2
2
− y+a−h
4
∆q if ep5 ≤ p2 ≤ ep6,
p2 − (a+ h)∆q if p2 > ep6,
with ep5 ≡ (y+ y−a√2 )∆q and ep6 ≡ 12(3a+5h− y)∆q. This best response has a disconti-
nuity at p2 = ep6, where the low-quality Þrm is indifferent between serving some of the
bigger mass of high-valuation consumers at a low price and serving only low-valuation
consumers from cohort 2 at a rather high price.
Finally, if high-valuation consumers wait for the second period, the demand of Þrm 2
is
DDII,2(p1, p2, y) =

Min{2(a+ h− ∆p
∆q
), 0} if ∆p > y∆q,
(a+ h− y) + (a+ h− ∆p
∆q
) if y∆q ≥ ∆p ≥ (a− h)∆q,
(a+ h− y) + 2h if ∆p < (a− h)∆q.
When looking at the corresponding proÞts of Þrm 2, we can again show that as long
as (2.1) holds marginal proÞts are negative for all p2 ≥ p1 + (a − h)(q2 − q1) and
positive for lower p2. Hence the reaction function is
RDII,2(p1, y) = p1 + (a− h)(q2 − q1).
Solving for the Nash equilibrium gives
Lemma 4 Consider a simultaneous price setting duopoly with the consumer popu-
lation faggII (θ, y) given above. For a ≥ 5h, the unique Nash equilibrium in prices is
given by pD1 = 0 and p
D
2 = (a−h)(q2−q1). The high-quality Þrm serves all consumers
in the market.
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As for the monopolist, the duopolist has an incentive to serve even the consumer
with the lowest valuation as long as average valuation is sufficiently large relative
to consumer heterogeneity. Therefore, condition (2.1) ensures us that in the second
period only one Þrm will be active in the market, the incumbent in the no innovation
case or the innovator otherwise. Furthermore, all waiting consumers will be served
in equilibrium at a price that equals the valuation (or difference in valuation in the
duopoly case) of the consumer with the lowest θ.
2.4 First Period
After Þrm 2 had the opportunity to preannounce the new product in t = 0, the
incumbent Þrm and the cohort 1 consumers update their initial belief ρ0 to eρ. And
with this additional information consumers decide whether to lock in product q1 or
to wait for the next period. The net utility of the Þrst alternative is given by U11(θ)
from (2.2). Plugging the second period equilibrium values in (2.3), we get for the
expected utility of waiting
E[U0(θ)] = eρ[δθq2 − δpD2 ] + (1− eρ)[δθq1 − δpM1 ] (2.4)
= eρδ[θq2 − (a− h)(q2 − q1)] + (1− eρ)δ[θq1 − (a− h)q1].
Note that both in the innovation and the no innovation event, all consumers expect
a positive net utility in the second period. Further, although the duopoly price of
the high quality good increases with the quality difference (q2 − q1), every consumer
beneÞts from a larger innovation step. Figure 2.2 depicts the indirect utility of the
two alternatives as a function of the consumers taste parameter θ. Two parameter
regimes have to be distinguished. If ∆ ≤ 1eρδ , then the slope of U11(θ) is steeper than
the slope of E[U0(θ)], implying that high-valuation consumers are more inclined to
buy in the Þrst period than low-valuation consumers. If ∆ > 1eρδ , then the expected
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Figure 2.2: (Indirect) utility functions for ∆ ≤ 1eρδ (left) and for ∆ > 1eρδ (right)
quality of the second period purchase is sufficiently high to make the high-valuation
consumers more patient than the low-valuation consumers.
In both cases, one gets the position of the consumer who is just indifferent between
buying q1 in period 1 and waiting for the second period, by setting equal (2.2) and
(2.4). This yields
eθ(p) ≡ p− (a− h)eρδ(q2 − q1)− (1− eρ)(a− h)δq1
q1 − eρδ(q2 − q1) . (2.5)
This threshold value determines the composition of the demand for the incumbents
product. If ∆ ≤ 1eρδ , all consumers in [eθ(p), a + h] will buy q1 in the Þrst period
and and leave the market. The remaining Þrst cohort consumers wait for the second
period, generating a consumer population faggI (θ, x = eθ(p)). Thus, the incumbents
demand from cohort 1 consumers is split into a certain Þrst period demand and an
expected second period demand that depends on the launch of the new technology.
Therefore, the incumbents expected proÞt function for this parameter regime7 takes
7Notice that our notation is in accordance with the two different demand constellations discussed
in Section 2.3.
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the following form
E[ΠI(p,eρ)] ≡ p[a+ h− eθ(p)] + δ(1− eρ)(a− h)q1[(eθ(p)− (a− h)) + 2h],
which he maximises for given (updated) expectations eρ with respect to the Þrst period
price p. Note that the incumbent serves the whole market in the Þrst period if and
only if (1 + δ)(a− h)q1 − p ≥ E[U0(a− h)] or
p ≤ (1 + δ − eρδ)(a− h)q1. (2.6)
For ∆ > 1eρδ , the discounted, expected value of the new product is higher than the
buy and keep value of the incumbents product. For this reason, consumers with a
higher marginal utility of quality are more willing to wait for the second period. This
also means that for a given Þrst period price p, all consumers in [a− h,eθ(p)] will buy
q1 and leave the market, while the upper part of the cohort will wait for the second
period and generate a faggII (θ, y = eθ(p)]) population. In this parameter regime (II),
the incumbent maximises
E[ΠII(p,eρ)] ≡ p[eθ(p)− (a− h)] + δ(1− eρ)(a− h)q1[(a+ h− eθ(p)) + 2h], (2.7)
and serves all cohort 1 consumers in the Þrst period if and only if (1+δ)(a+h)q1−p ≥
E[U0(a+ h)] or
p ≤ (a+ h+ (a− h)δ(1− eρ)q1 − eρδ2h(q2 − q1). (2.8)
Proposition 1 summarises the solution to the maximisation problem of the incumbent
in both parameter regimes. DeÞne
b∆ ≡ a+ 3h
4heρδ ,
then
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Proposition 1 For given expectations eρ, the incumbents optimal price in the Þrst
period is:
p∗ =

(1 + δ − eρδ)(a− h)q1 if 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1eρδ ,
(1 + δ − eρδ)(a− h)q1 − 2h(eρδ(q2 − q1)− q1) if 1eρδ ≤ ∆ ≤ b∆,
(1 + δ − eρδ)(a− h)q1 − (a−h)q12 if ∆ > b∆.
For innovation steps ∆ ≤ 1eρδ , the incumbents product has a higher expected quality
than the new technology which makes it optimal for Þrm 1 to preempt the market
with the price that makes the consumer with the lowest valuation indifferent between
buying and waiting. For intermediate values of ∆ (later referred to as parameter
regime II.1 ), the expected value of the new technology is higher than the quality of
the existing one but they are still close substitutes which implies that the incumbent
has relatively low costs (in terms of a relatively high Þrst period price p) to attract
the whole market. However, if ∆ exceeds the threshold value b∆ (region II.2 ), it is no
longer optimal to serve the highest valuation consumers with a lower price and the
incumbent only sells to low-valuation consumers, while all consumers θ in [eθ(p∗), a+h]
wait for the second period. The optimal price p∗ decreases with a higher quality q2
and higher expectations eρ since these variables make the consumers more patient and
require stronger price cuts from the incumbent in order to retain demand.
To conclude this section, we will look at the impact of the incumbents pricing strategy
on the residual demand RD from cohort 1 in period 2. Plugging the optimal price
from Proposition 1 into (2.5), one obtains
Corollary 1 The residual demand from cohort 1 consumers is given by
RD∗(eρ, .) ≡
 0 if 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ b∆,2h− (a−h)q1
2[eρδ(q2−q1)−q1] if ∆ > b∆.
In fact, in the present model, Þrm 2 is solely interested in the mass of cohort 1
consumers that is waiting since the price in the second period is independent of
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the composition of the consumer population. Corollary 1 shows that the incumbent
prefers to preempt the market as long as the upcoming innovation step is not too
large. For sufficiently high ∆, the mass of waiting cohort 1 consumers increases with
a higher q2, eρ, h and δ. It decreases with a higher a.
2.5 The Preannouncement Decision
When considering the preannouncement decision, the innovating entrant rationally
anticipates the behaviour of the incumbent in the pre-entry period and knows that his
signal is used by the market participants to update their priors. In this section, we will
look for Perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game, in which Þrm 2 chooses a cohort 1
demand maximising announcement strategy for beliefs that are updated according to
Bayes rule. Let us denote β as the probability that Þrm 2 preannounces an innovation.
Two types of equilibria can be distinguished: no announcement (pooling) equilibria
and announcement equilibria.
In an announcement equilibrium (β∗=1)8, consumers and the incumbent know that
it is proÞtable for an entrant to preannounce its new product, i.e. they can infer from
the absence of an announcement that there has been no innovation, i.e.
eρ = E[innovation | no announcement] = 0. (2.9)
This Bayesian updating is anticipated by the entrant who has an incentive to prean-
nounce whenever the following condition holds
RD∗(ρ = 1, .) > RD∗(ρ = 0, .). (2.10)
In a pooling equilibrium (β∗ = 0), the entrant prefers not to announce the innovation.
Thus, consumers and Þrm 1 can interpret the absence of an announcement either
8Since we do not consider the case of untruthful preannouncements, any preannouncement
changes the priors to eρ = 1.
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with the possibility that there is no innovation or with the event that the innovation
is not preannounced. Their priors remain unchanged,
eρ = E[innovation | no announcement] = ρ0. (2.11)
This argument yields the following necessary and sufficient condition for pooling equi-
libria:
RD∗(ρ = ρ0, .) ≥ RD∗(ρ = 1, .). (2.12)
Proposition 2 gives the different equilibria regimes.
Proposition 2 Depending on the size of the innovation step ∆, we get the following
two types of Perfect Bayesian equilibria:
1. 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆A ≡ a+3h
4δh
: The innovating Þrm does not preannounce (β∗=0) and
market participants hold the belief given in (2.11).
2. ∆ > ∆A: It is always proÞtable for the innovating Þrm to preannounce (β∗=1);
belief updating follows (2.9).
Figure 2.4 in the next section shows the graph of the preannouncement probability
β∗ as a function of the new products quality. The main comparative statics of these
equilibria are summarised in the next corollary.
Corollary 2 Comparative statics of the equilibria described in Proposition 2 yield:
∂∆A(.)
∂a
> 0,
∂∆A(.)
∂h
< 0,
∂∆A(.)
∂δ
< 0.
The rationale behind Corollary 2 is rather simple. Preannouncements will take place
for parameter constellations at which preemption is most expensive for the incumbent.
Ceteris paribus, this is true whenever the upcoming innovation step is sufficiently
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large or if the discount rate is high, which is equivalent to saying that time between
launch and preannouncement is short for a given discount rate. Furthermore, there
are more preannouncements in industries with a more heterogenous population of
consumers. This holds because inframarginal rents for consumers are higher when
tastes are more dispersed and this increases the value of waiting for higher quality. In
the limiting case, where h → 0, the incentive to preannounce disappears completely
because consumers foresee that the innovating Þrm can appropriate all the innovation
rents and this makes it easy for the incumbent to preempt the market in the pre-entry
period.
By contrast, the average consumer valuation has a negative impact on the occurrence
of an announcement because it raises disproportionately the value of todays purchase
option compared to any expected value of future product generations. Interestingly,
the initial innovation probability ρ0 has no impact on the preannouncement behaviour
of an entrant. On the one hand, a higher innovation probability increases the incen-
tives for consumers to wait, but on the other, it makes the incumbent more aggressive
in the pre-entry period. Taken together, these effects cancel out.
2.6 Welfare Implications
Obviously, there are two potential welfare distortions in this model. First, we have
imperfect competition in both periods and second, there is an asymmetric information
constellation between the potentially innovating Þrm and the other market partici-
pants. This section will show that in some sense our social planner has to trade off
these two imperfections.
In order to analyse the welfare effects of the preannouncement behaviour in this
second-best world, we will take the market structure as given and concentrate on the
efficiency of the information transmission in the economy. Our welfare measure will
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be the ex ante expected total consumer surplus of cohort 1 which is the sum of the
expected net utility of the consumers who buy product q1 in period 1 and the expected
net utility of cohort 1 consumers who buy a product of quality qi, i = 1, 2, in period 2.9
For the computations of these measures, we have to return to the parameter regimes
in Proposition 1, since each of them corresponds to a different allocation of consumers
to products and periods and to a different Þrst period price of the incumbent. Denote
E[CSkr (eρ)] the interim consumer surplus with k = Inno (NoIn) standing for the (no)
innovation subgame and r ∈ {I, II.1, II.2} standing for the respective parameter
regime.10
If 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1eρδ ,all consumers in [a− h, a+ h] buy the incumbents product in the Þrst
period. Therefore, for given (updated) expectations eρ, the interim consumer surplus
for cohort 1 is the same whether there is an innovation or not, i.e.
E[CSInnoI (eρ)] = E[CSNoInI (eρ)] = 12h
Z b
a
((1 + δ)θq1 − (1 + δ − eρδ)(a− h)q1)dθ.
For 1eρδ < ∆ ≤ b∆, all consumers of cohort 1 buy product q1 and pay p∗ = (1 + δ −eρδ)(a− h)q1 − 2h(eρδ(q2 − q1)− q1), this yields
E[CSInnoII.1 (eρ)] = E[CSNoInII.1 (eρ)] = 12h
Z b
a
((1 + δ)θq1 − p∗)dθ.
Finally, in the second part of parameter region II the incumbents optimal Þrst period
price is (1+ δ−eρδ)(a−h)q1− (a−h)q12 and consumers with a valuation in [eθ(p∗), a+h]
decide to wait for the second period. Thus, the launch of a new product generates a
consumer surplus of
E[CSInnoII.2 (eρ)] = 12h
Z eθ(p∗)
a−h
((1 + δ)θq1 − p∗)dθ + 1
2h
Z a+h
eθ(p∗) δ(θq2 − (a− h)(q2 − q1))dθ.
9Note that consumers of cohort 2 are not affected by any preannouncements and can thus be left
out of the welfare considerations.
10The term interim refers to the moment after the signalling of the entrant but before the possible
introduction of a new product.
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If the innovation is not introduced, we have
E[CSNoInII.2 (eρ)] = 12h
Z eθ(p∗)
a−h
((1 + δ)θq1 − p∗)dθ + 1
2h
Z a+h
eθ(p∗) δ(θq1 − (a− h)q1)dθ.
Before proceeding to the ex ante measures, some comments on the interim sur-
plus functions are in order. First, it is straightforward to show that if there is
a new product, more certainty about it is always beneÞcial to the consumers, i.e.
E[CSInno(ρ00)] > E[CSInno(ρ0)] for ρ00 > ρ0. Higher innovation expectations entail a
higher threat of entry and thus a lower Þrst period price of the incumbent, an effect
that in the following will be referred to as the contestability effect. Moreover, in the
innovation event a higher eρ means that the purchase decision is based on better in-
formation (since the true probability of the launch of a new product is 1) and there
is less scope for a mismatch between consumers and products.
Nevertheless, in the no innovation event, better information (a lower eρ) is not always
beneÞcial. Figure 2.3 below depicts the interim consumer surplus in the innovation
and in the no innovation event. High expectations in the no innovation event lead to
a mismatch of consumers to periods and a loss of consumer rent due to waiting. But
once this mismatch is eliminated (which is the case in the regimes I and II.1 since
the incumbent preempts the market), the negative effect of the decreasing threat of
entry (implying a higher Þrst period price) is dominating and the consumer surplus
decreases for lower eρ.
With this in mind, let us now turn to the calculation of the optimal preannouncement
probability βopt. Assume βopt can be implemented exogenously by a social planner
that is maximising the ex ante expected consumer surplus. To compute this measure,
one has to take into account three different events and the respective beliefs held
by the incumbent and the consumers. First, with probability ρ0β, there will be an
innovation that is preannounced in period 0. Secondly, with probability ρ0(1 − β),
a new product is introduced but not preannounced and Þnally, with the remaining
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Figure 2.3: Expected (interim) consumer surplus
probability (1− ρ0) there will be no innovation. The absence of a preannouncement
given any β leads to the following Bayesian belief updating
eρ(β) = prob(innovation/no announcement)
prob(innovation/no announcement) + prob(no innovation)
=
ρ0(1− β)
ρ0(1− β) + 1− ρ0
=
ρ0(1− β)
1− ρ0β
.
Thus, the ex ante expected consumer surplus can be written as follows
E[CS(β)] ≡ ρ0βE[CSInno(1)] + ρ0(1− β)E[CSInno(
ρ0(1− β)
1− ρ0β
)] + (2.13)
(1− ρ0)E[CSNoIn(
ρ0(1− β)
1− ρ0β
)].
The announcement probability β enters this surplus function in two ways. In case
of an innovation, it inßuences the relative weight of preannouncement versus pooling
equilibria. In this respect, the effect of increasing β is - ceteris paribus - always
positive. But it also appears as a measure of the contestability of the market if no
preannouncement occurs, since it determines the belief updating. A higher β implies
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that consumers and the incumbent ascribe the absence of an announcement more to
the possibility that there is no innovation since eρ(β) decreases in β. And - as discussed
above - lower innovation expectations might have a negative impact on E[CSNoIn].
We demonstrate in the appendix that these two opposed effects generate a surplus
function that has two local maxima over a large range of parameters. One at β = 1
which takes advantage of the beneÞts of an announced innovation and one at a lower
level of β which relies on keeping up the threat of entry and thus reducing the market
power of the incumbent in the case of no innovation. The result of the social planner
solving the programmemaxβE[CS(β)] is explicitly derived in the appendix and given
in the following proposition. DeÞne
∆0 ≡ 1
δ
,
∆1 ≡ 4h+
p
ρ20(a− h) + 16h2(1− ρ0)2
4ρ0δh
and
∆2 ≡ a+ 3h
4ρ0δh
.
Then,
Proposition 3 If ∆ ≤ ∆0, consumers are indifferent between all β in [0,1]. Other-
wise, the preannouncement probability that maximises the expected consumer surplus
(2.13), is given by
βopt =

1 if ∆0 ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆1,
0 if ∆1 < ∆ ≤ ∆2,
1− (1−ρ0)(a+3h)q1
ρ0[4δh(q2−q1)−(a+3h)q1] if ∆ > ∆2.
Figure 2.4 below sketches the graph of the efficient preannouncement probability βopt
as a function of the innovation step size ∆. For ∆ ≤ ∆0, the overall value of the
new technology is too small to make a difference. Consumers will choose the old
product independently of their beliefs about an innovation. By contrast, for larger
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innovation steps, the result of Proposition 3 reßects the trade off between information
transmission leading to a better match between consumers and products and the
contestability of the market implying low Þrst period prices in the no innovation
event. For rather low values of ∆, the threat of entry is not sufficient to force the
incumbent to set a low Þrst period price. On the other hand, a high ∆ increases the
value of a good match between products and consumers. Therefore, only intermediate
values of ∆ make it optimal to choose a low announcement probability β in order to
let consumers beneÞt from a contestable market.
1
0
*β
optβ
∆
0∆ A∆ 1∆ 2∆
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Figure 2.4: Equilibrium (β∗) and efficient (βopt) announcement probability
Now, we are in the position to compare the efficient preannouncement with the market
outcome described in Proposition 2. Since it turns out that ∆0 ≤ ∆A ≤ ∆1 we obtain
Corollary 3 The market outcome, as described by Proposition 2, can yield efficient
preannouncement, excessive announcement and excessive pooling.
This overprovision result is due to the fact that from an ex ante point of view, the
innovative Þrm only considers the impact of the preannouncement on the market
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outcome if the new product can actually be launched. She does not take into account
the effect of her preannouncement behaviour if there is no innovation, i.e. the potential
entrant is not concerned about the contestability of the market. In a situation,
in which a preannouncement is optimal, its absence generates the certainty that
there is no upcoming innovation and without the threat of entry, the incumbent Þrm
regains market power and can extract more consumer surplus. Thus, the innovating
Þrm confers a negative externality to the consumers and tends to make too many
preannouncements.
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Figure 2.5: Excessive announcing and pooling in the ∆− ρ0-space
Finally, let us compare the market outcome with two scenarios that are somehow
more realistic than the randomising choice of a social planner considered above. First,
consider a full information scenario (FIS), in which the result of the R&D process
is common knowledge in the economy. One might think, for example, of a law that
forces innovating Þrms to preannounce their new product at least a minimum time
before the actual launch. Or perhaps of an omniscient innovation agency that is able
Innovation Preannouncement in a Vertically Differentiated Industry 32
to gather and spread all information about upcoming product launches. Formally,
this means that the incumbent and the consumers can update their priors correctly
and we get
E[CSFIS] = E[CS(1)] = ρ0E[CS
Inno(1)] + (1− ρ0)E[CSNoIn(0)]. (2.14)
Further, consider a scenario, in which a law prohibits preannouncements of any kind.
In such a no information scenario (NIS), consumers would derive a surplus of
E[CSNIS] = E[CS(0)] = ρ0E[CS
Inno(ρ0)] + (1− ρ0)E[CSNoIn(ρ0)]. (2.15)
The next corollary compares the consumers surplus in the full information and the
no information scenario. DeÞne
∆3 :=
2
p
(a− h)2 + 16h2
δ(1 + ρ0)
p
(a− h)2 + 16h2 − δp(1 + ρ0)2(a− h)2 + 16h2(1− ρ0)2 ,
then
Corollary 4 If ∆1 < ∆ < ∆3, then E[CSNIS] > E[CSFIS], else E[CSNIS] ≤
E[CSFIS].
Figure 2.5 illustrates this result in the ∆ − ρ0−parameter space and relates the effi-
cient consumer policy to the market outcome of Proposition 2. Consumers would be
best off if product announcements were banned for all ∆ in [∆1,∆3], that means if
the upcoming innovation step is intermediate but the innovation probability is rather
high. By contrast, if ∆ is in [∆0,∆A] the best consumer policy is to enforce prean-
nouncements in order to prevent excessive pooling of the innovating Þrm. Eventually,
in the remaining parameter space, the market outcome coincides with the consumers
optimal choice between FIS and NIS.
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2.7 Concluding remarks
This paper analyses the role of innovation preannouncements in markets with im-
perfect competition and rational, forward looking consumers. For innovative Þrms,
preannouncements are a way to induce potential customers to wait for the innovation
instead of buying the presently available technology. But in the presence of an incum-
bent Þrm with market power, this advantage has to be traded off with the possibility
of a strategic reaction of the latter in the form of preemptive pricing in the pre-entry
period. Our model incorporates the intertemporal product choice of consumers under
uncertainty into the framework of a vertically differentiated industry and enables us
to rationalise some of the Þndings of an empirical study on product preannounce-
ments by Eliahsberg and Robertson (1988). In analysing interview data of 75 Þrms,
they concluded that preannouncements are more likely if the measure for competitive
environment is low, if the upcoming innovation step is large and if consumers are
sufficiently forward-looking.
More surprisingly, the welfare analysis of our model shows that, from the ex ante
point of view of the consumers, the signalling equilibria of the market can lead to
under- and overprovision of preannouncements. This result is due to the fact that
a policymaker has to trade off transmission of information in the economy and the
contestability of the pre-innovation market. In this vein, a ban on preannouncements
is the best consumer policy in constellations in which the industry is expected to
grow fast and the next innovation step is neither too large nor too small. Innovation
preannouncements have to be enforced when the new technology is not much better
than the old one.
To conclude, let us discuss some limitations of this work that could serve as possible
starting point for extensions of the framework. First, we conÞned our analysis to the
case in which the incumbent can not introduce the new technology. This extension
would enrich the possible strategic interaction of the model, in particular, it would
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allow for the use of product preannouncements as a means to deter entry into the
industry, a strategy that is often mentioned in relation with Microsofts product
introductions.
A second issue is the exclusion of untruthful preannouncement which enabled us to
concentrate on the strategic reaction argument. In the absence of a contract between
consumer and preannouncing Þrm, the costs of waiting for any new technology will
be sunk as soon as the Þrm is not able to introduce the innovation at the promised
date. Thus, in a setting with more than two periods, the innovating Þrm could be
tempted to preannounce the product too early to make consumers wait and postpone
the launch afterwards. Rational consumers would anticipate this and would no longer
believe in announcements without commitment. Therefore, in order to make trustable
announcements the innovative Þrm would additionally need some commitment mech-
anisms (like reputation or sunk costs) to make consumers wait and this might dilute
the communication process between the Þrm and the market to some degree but the
qualitative nature of the effects discussed in this work would not change.
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2.8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The proÞt function of the monopolist is piecewise concave and continuous. For Lemma
1 to hold it suffices to show that the marginal proÞt is negative for all p1 ≥ (a−h)q1.
For (a− h)q1 ≤ p1 ≤ xq1, the marginal proÞt is a+ h+ x− 4p1q1 , which is negative for
all p1 >
q1
4
(a+h+x). This threshold is smaller than (a−h)q1 for all x in [a−h, a+h]
if and only if a > 3h. For xq1 ≤ p1 ≤ (a + h)q1, the marginal proÞt is a + h − 2p1q1 ,
which is negative for all p1 >
q1
2
(a + h). This threshold is smaller than xq1 for all x
in [a− h, a+ h] if and only if a > 3h. Thus, p∗1 = (a− h)q1.¥
Proof of Lemma 2
For (a− h)q1 ≤ p1 ≤ yq1, the marginal proÞt is 2(a+ h)− x− 2p1q1 , which is negative
for all p1 >
q1
2
(2a + 2h − x). This threshold is smaller than (a − h)q1 for all y in
[a−h, a+ h] if and only if a > 5h. For p1 > yq1, the marginal proÞt is 2(a+ h)− 4p1q1 ,
which is negative for all p1 >
q1
2
(a+ h). This threshold is smaller than yq1 for all y in
[a− h, a+ h] if and only if a > 3h. Thus, if a > 5h, p∗1 = (a− h)q1.¥
Proof of Lemma 3
Given the piecewise linear and globally concave demand schedule, the proÞt function
of Þrm 1 is always single-peaked. The interior maximum for x∆q ≤ ∆p ≤ (a+ h)∆q
is then deÞned by ∂[p1((x− a+ h) + (∆p∆q − a))]/∂p1 = 0, which yields
p1 =
1
2
[p2 − (2a− 2h− x)∆q].
It is straightforward to check that this value is in the regime range whenever ep3 ≤ p2 ≤ep4,with ep2, ep3 deÞned in the text. Equivalently, the interior solution for ∆p < x∆q is
given by ∂[p12(
∆p
∆q
− a+ h)]/∂p1 = 0 or
p1 =
1
2
[p2 − (a− h)∆q].
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This solution holds for all p2 in [ep1, ep2]. Finally, taking into account the three possible
corner solutions, one can compose the reaction function RDI,1(p2, x).
Firm 2s proÞt function is continuous. In order to show that RDI,2(p1, x) = p1 + (a −
h)∆q, it suffices to show that the marginal proÞt is negative for p2 ≥ p1+ (a− h)∆q.
For (a−h)∆q ≤ ∆p ≤ x∆q the marginal revenue is negative if p1 > 12 [5h−3a+x]∆q,
which is negative and holds for all non-negative p1 and all x whenever a > 3h. For
∆p > x∆q the marginal revenue is negative if p1 > 12 [a+h−2x]∆q, which is negative
and holds for all non-negative p1 and all x whenever a > 3h.
Hence, for a > 3h, it is easy to check that (p∗1 = 0, p
∗
2 = (a − h)∆q) is the unique
solution to the equation system
p1 = R
D
I,1(p2, x) and p2 = R
D
I,2(p1, x).
which proves the lemma.¥
Proof of Lemma 4
Consider Þrm 1s maximisation problem. The interior maximum for (a + h)∆q ≥
∆p ≥ y∆q is given by
p1 =
p2
2
− y + a− h
4
∆q
and the interior maximum for ∆p < y∆q by
p1 =
1
2
[p2 − (a− h)∆q].
Check that Þrm 1s proÞt function has two peaks for p2 in [12(3x−a−h)∆q, (2x−a−
h)∆q]. The local maximum value of the smaller maximiser is larger than the local
maximum of the larger one whenever p2 > ep6, with ep6 given in the text.
Consider the maximisation problem of Þrm 2. For y∆q ≥ ∆p ≥ (a − h)∆q, its
marginal revenue is negative whenever p1 > (4h− y)∆q, which is negative and holds
for all non-negative p1 and all y whenever a > 5h. For∆p > y∆q the marginal revenue
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is negative if p1 > [3h−a]∆q, which is negative and holds for all non-negative p1 and
all x whenever a > 3h.
Hence, for a > 5h, we have the reaction functions given in the text and from this, it
is straightforward to check that (p∗1 = 0, p
∗
2 = (a− h)∆q) is the unique mutually best
reply.¥
Proof of Proposition 3
The analysis of the consumer surplus E[CS(β)] is rather tedious because dependent
on beliefs and other parameters the economy can be in one of the three regimes
identiÞed in Proposition 1. We will proceed in two steps. First, we will identify local
maxima over the whole parameter range. And then, for all regions where there are
more than one, we will pick the global maximiser.
Given a preannouncement probability β, the economy is in region II.2 whenever 0 ≤
β ≤ β1 ≡ ρ0δ(q2−q1)−q1ρ0[δq2−(1+δ)q1] , it is in region II.1 if β1 < β ≤ β2 ≡ 1−
(1−ρ0)(a+3h)q1
ρ0[4δh(q2−q1)−(a+3h)q1]
and in region I for β2 < β ≤ 1. Note that β1 > 0 if ∆ > ∆2 and β2 > 0 if ∆ > b∆ >
∆0 (∆0, ∆2, b∆ are deÞned in the text). Some calculations give the slopes of the ex
ante consumer surplus in these three parameter ranges. For region I, one gets
∂E[CSI(β)]
∂β
=

0 if 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆0
2h[ρ0[δq2 − (1 + δ)q1] > 0 if ∆0 ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆A
16h2(δ∆q−q1)+(a−h)2
16h(δ∆q−q1) > 0 if ∆ > ∆
A.
Region II.1 only exists if ∆ > b∆ thus,
∂E[CSII.1(β)]
∂β
=
 0 if b∆ ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆A[4hδ∆q+(a−3h)q1][(a+3h)q1−4hδ∆q]ρ0
16h(δ∆q−q1) < 0 if ∆ > ∆
A.
Finally, in region II.2 which exists for ∆ > ∆2,
∂E[CSII.1(β)]
∂β
=
δ2(a− h)2(∆q)2q21(1− ρ0)2ρ0
16h(δ∆q − q1)[q1(1 + ρ0δ − (1 + δ)ρ0β)− (1− β)ρ0δq2]2
> 0.
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At least four conclusions can be drawn from this. First, for 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆0, the only
relevant region is I and in this region the slope is 0, i.e. consumers are indifferent.
Second, for ∆0 ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆A, there is only local maximum at β = 1 since the slope in
region II.1 is 0 and positive for higher β in region I. Third, for ∆A ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆2, two
local maxima exist, one at β = 0 and one at β = 1. Finally, if region II.2 exists for
∆ > ∆2, the two local maxima are β = β2 and β = 1 because
∂E[CS(β)]
∂β
> 0 for all β
in [0,β2].
To conclude, we look for the global maximiser in all cases in which we have more
than one local maximiser. For ∆A ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆2, the choice is between β = 0 and β = 1.
Some calculations yield that E[CS(1)] ≥ E[CS(0)] if ∆ ≤ ∆1 with ∆1 given in the
text. For ∆ > ∆2 we get that E[CS(β2)] ≥ E[CS(1)]. This completes the proof.¥
Proof of Corollary 3
The only change to the previous proof of Proposition 3 is that for ∆ > ∆2 we have
to compare the local maxima at β = 0 and β = 1. Straightforward calculations show
that E[CS(1)] ≥ E[CS(0)] if and only if ∆ > ∆3(> ∆2).¥
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Chapter 3
Two Notes on Models with
Endogenous Price Leadership
3.1 Introduction
Price leadership in markets is an ever recurring topic in industrial organisation and
competition policy since its Þrst discussion by Stigler (1947) and Markham (1951).
These two authors assumed dominant Þrm markets with one Þrm controlling at least
50 percent of the industrys output and a price taking fringe of small Þrms. They con-
cluded that the large Þrm should have an incentive to commit Þrst to an umbrella
price for the industry with all small Þrms following suit. All later work concen-
trated on extending this dominant Þrm paradigm to oligopolistic industries where
Þrms realise their interdependence, act strategically and where leadership arises en-
dogenously. Our work takes on this line of research and challenges two of their main
Þndings.
In the Þrst part, we analyse a vertically differentiated industry in which two Þrms
Þrst set qualities and then prices. We show that when one allows for endogenous price
leadership it is the high-quality Þrm that takes the lead and that equilibrium prices
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are higher compared to simultaneous price setting. Nevertheless, the emergence of
price leadership affects the quality choices of Þrms in the Þrst stage. In particular, less
aggressive sequential price setting in the short run increases the incentive of the low-
quality Þrm to invest in quality and therefore to decrease product differentiation in
the long run. Consequently, price leadership implies higher prices and higher average
product quality which in sum may lead to a net gain for consumers.
In a second model, we investigate the role of Þrm size as a determinant of price
leadership in industries. Previous studies showed that if Þrm size is measured by
capacity then price leadership of the large Þrm arises endogenously because the small
capacity Þrm stands to lose more by being undercut by a large rival. Consequently,
the smaller Þrm should have a stronger preference for assuming the followership role.
Deneckere and Kovenock and Lee (1992) claim that the same holds when one identiÞes
Þrm size with the base of loyal costumers. Our note demonstrates that this result
crucially depends on the size of switching costs for the consumers. In Deneckere et
al. (1992) it is assumed that switching costs are prohibitive, i.e. once a consumer has
bought a brand he will never switch afterwards. Thus, demand consists of consumers
that are either locked in at Þrm 1 or at Þrm 2 or are not brand loyal at all. The
endogenous determination of moves emerges from the fact that the small base Þrm
has a greater incentive to follow in order to undercut and grab the unlocked customers
that are in the market (while the large base Þrm would stand to lose more from
undercutting since a low undercutting price would also have to be applied over the
larger loyal base). In this work, we reconsider the framework of this model but allow
for non-prohibitive switching costs. Once consumers are able to switch the supplier at
some Þnite cost, incentives change because both Þrms can undercut as well as being
undercut. We will show that the threat of being undercut is higher for the Þrm with
the large customer base and that endogenous price leadership arises with the smaller
Þrm as leader. Moreover, we will demonstrate that consumer switching costs give
rise to what has been called - but to the best of our knowledge never been found -
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in this literature a marriage in heaven: one Þrm strictly prefers to lead, the other
one to follow. Finally, welfare considerations indicate that over a large range of the
parameter space the endogenously emerging price leadership pattern maximises total
welfare and that only for rather symmetric customer bases simultaneous price setting
would be welfare improving.
Both parts of this paper are related to the steadily growing body of literature on
industry leadership that analyses under which conditions Þrms have incentives to
lead, to follow or to move simultaneously. First results were concerned with the
nature of competition between Þrms. It was found that quantity competition induces
a struggle for industry leadership while price competition gives Þrms a preference
for followership (cf. Gal-Or (1985), Dowrick (1986)). When the strategy space is
extended to quantity-price pairs Þrms prefer to follow rather than to lead (Boyer and
Moreaux (1987)). While we assume price competition in both models below, it is
only in the Þrst one that Þrms display a strict preference to follow.
A second issue is the identity of the industry leader. It has been argued that the Þrm
with
 the larger capacity (Deneckere and Kovenock (1992)),
 the higher costs (Ono (1972), Deneckere and Kovenock (1992)),
 the better information about market conditions (Rotemberg and Saloner (1990),
Cooper (1996)) and
 the higher cost variance (Albaek (1990))
can be expected to be the industry leader. In this paper, we add two more Þrm
characteristics to this list, namely, a high product quality and a small loyal customer
base.
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Finally, from a methodological point of view, the literature on price leadership can be
divided in two different approaches to the endogenisation of the leadership structure.
The choice of role approach systematically introduced by Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990) extends the original basic game by adding a preplay stage at which Þrms
simultaneously decide whether to move early or late in the basic game. The basic
game is then played according to these timing decisions. The second approach is to
explicitly model the dynamic game of price setting as it is demonstrated in Deneckere
and Kovenock (1992) or Maskin and Tirole (1988). In this paper, we follow the Þrst
approach and claim that our results should also hold in a dynamic version of the
model.
This work is organised as follows. In the next section we analyse the classical
model of vertically differentiated industry. In section 3 we look at the model with
consumers switching costs while the last section is meant for some concluding remarks
and comments on the empirical relevance of the two models. The inner organisation
of section 2 and 3 is identical. We Þrst characterise price equilibria, then investigate
the incentives for an endogenous determination of the timing of price announcements
and Þnally compare the equilibrium outcome with the social optimum. All relevant
proofs are delegated to the appendix.
3.2 Price leadership and vertical differentiation
3.2.1 The Model
Consider the following model of vertical product differentiation introduced by Shaked
and Sutton (1982). A consumers utility is described by U = θqi−pi if he consumes a
good of quality qi and pays price pi and by 0 otherwise. The parameter θ which mea-
sures the taste for quality is uniformly distributed across the population of consumers
in [0, 1]. Total mass of consumers is normalised to 1.
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Suppose there are two Þrms, 1 and 2, that produce and offer products of quality
q1 and q2 at prices p1 and p2. To simplify the exposition, assume that Þrms have
no production costs. Suppose further that only product qualities in [0, q] can be
implemented but that this choice is costless.1
The time structure of the model is as follows. In the Þrst stage, Þrms simultaneously
choose the quality qi of their product. In the second stage, Þrms will set their prices
pi. In order to endogenise the timing of (committed) price quotes we will consider
a simple timing subgame in which Þrms are assumed to choose the point in time of
their price announcement. Afterwards, all prices are set accordingly and consumers
choose whether to buy product 1, 2 or not all. This overall structure insinuates that
quality choices are a Þrms long term variable whereas prices can be changed more
often. We look for subgame perfect equilibria of the game and solve the model by
backward induction.
3.2.2 Price competition
In the last stage, qualities have already been chosen and the sequence of price quotes
is agreed upon. In order to analyse the price competition between the two Þrms, we
will proceed in two steps. In the spirit of subgame perfectness, we will Þrst derive the
demand functions for any given pair of prices and then solve for a Nash equilibrium
in prices. Assume without loss of generality q1 > q2.
The consumer eθ who is indifferent between buying product 1 or 2 can be found by
solving eθq1 − p1 = eθq2 − p2, which yields eθ = p1−p2q1−q2 . The consumer that is indifferent
between buying the low quality or not all is at p2
q2
. Thus, the demand for the high
quality good q1 consists of all high valuation consumers in [eθ, 1] while consumers in
1This formulation concentrates on the pure product differentiation effects and allows for explicit
solutions of all subgames. Introducing linear quality costs does not qualitatively affect any of our
results.
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[p2
q2
,eθ] choose q2. Hence, demand functions are given by
D1(p1, p2) = (1− p1 − p2
q1 − q2 ), (3.1)
D2(p1, p2) = (
p1 − p2
q1 − q2 −
p2
q2
).
With no marginal costs, Þrms maximise piDi(p1, p2) with respect to pi taking the other
Þrms choice as given. Simple calculations yield the respective reaction functions
pR1 (p2) =
p2 + q1 − q2
2
(3.2)
and
pR2 (p1) =
p1q2
q1
. (3.3)
As one can easily check, prices are strategic complements, i.e. a Þrms optimal price
increases in its rivals price. Note however, that the low-quality Þrms incentive to
follow price increases of the high-quality supplier is lower the greater the quality
differential.
When considering the endogenous timing of price announcements in this duopoly,
three situations can be distinguished. First, Þrms may set prices simultaneously.
Solving the equation system given by (3.2) and (3.3) with respect to (p1, p2), we
obtain the following Bertrand-Nash-equilibrium in prices
psim1 (q1, q2) =
2q1(q1 − q2)
4q1 − q2 , p
sim
2 (q1, q2) =
q2(q1 − q2)
4q1 − q2 (3.4)
and the corresponding proÞts
Πsim1 (q1, q2) =
4q21(q1 − q2)
(4q1 − q2)2 , Π
sim
2 (q1, q2) =
q1q2(q1 − q2)
(4q1 − q2)2 . (3.5)
It is obvious that the price and the proÞts of the high-quality Þrm increase in the
quality differential (q1 − q2). By contrast, an increase in product differentiation has
a non-monotonous impact on price and proÞts of the low-quality Þrm 2, which Þrst
increase due to stronger product differentiation but then decrease.
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Secondly, if the high-quality Þrm commits to a price before Þrm 2, it takes the latters
optimal reaction into account and maximises p1D1(p1, pR2 (p1)) with respect to p1. This
yields
p121 (q1, q2) =
q1(q1 − q2)
2q1 − q2 , p
12
2 (q1, q2) =
q2(q1 − q2)
4q1 − 2q2 (3.6)
as equilibrium prices and
Π121 (q1, q2) =
q1(q1 − q2)
4q1 − 2q2 , Π
12
2 (q1, q2) =
q1q2(q1 − q2)
4(2q1 − q2)2 (3.7)
as equilibrium proÞts.
Finally, if the low-quality Þrm takes the price leadership it maximises p2D2(pR1 (p2), p2)
which results in an equilibrium given by
p211 (q1, q2) =
(4q1 − q2)(q1 − q2)
8q1 − 4q2 , p
21
2 (q1, q2) =
q2(q1 − q2)
4q1 − 2q2 (3.8)
and
Π211 (q1, q2) =
(4q1 − q2)2(q1 − q2)
16(2q1 − q2)2 , Π
21
2 (q1, q2) =
q2(q1 − q2)
16q1 − 8q2 . (3.9)
Let us compare prices and returns of the two Þrms in the different settings
Remark 1 For given qualities (q1, q2), we obtain
p121 (q1, q2) > p
21
1 (q1, q2) > p
sim
1 (q1, q2)
and
p122 (q1, q2) = p
21
2 (q1, q2) > p
sim
2 (q1, q2).
For the Þrms proÞts, i=1, 2, j=3-i, we get:
Πjii (q1, q2) > Π
ij
i (q1, q2) > Π
sim
i (q1, q2).
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The high-quality Þrm can charge the highest price when it moves Þrst and the lowest
when prices are set simultaneously. The low-quality Þrm sets the same price as leader
or follower but a lower price whenever they set prices simultaneously. By consequence,
we get, when comparing equilibrium proÞts, the well-known result that Þrms prefer to
follow rather than to take the lead under price competition (Gal-Or (1985), Dowrick
(1986)). Nevertheless, they also prefer both to take the lead instead of setting prices
simultaneously.
3.2.3 Endogenous Price Leadership
With the results from the previous section, we can now investigate the endogenous
timing of price quotes. The standard approach to this problem is to introduce a
preliminary stage in which Þrms are assumed to choose their roles in the pricing
game. Assume that only two dates of price quoting are possible, t0 and t1, and that
Þrms simultaneously commit to one of these two dates (see Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990) or Robson (1990) for a more detailed description of this game). Figure 3.1
gives the payoff matrix of this coordination game.


	
 	



	
 	



	
 	



	
 	



),( 211 qq
simΠ
),( 212 qq
simΠ ),( 21
12
2 qqΠ
),( 21
12
1 qqΠ
),( 21
21
1 qqΠ
),( 21
21
2 qqΠ
),( 211 qq
simΠ
),( 212 qq
simΠ
Figure 3.1: Pay-off matrix of the timing game
It is then straightforward to check that
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Lemma 1 Sequential price moves are the only two Nash equilibria in pure strategies
of the timing game.
The proof of this lemma is obvious from Remark 1 in the preceding section. Firms
would never choose the same date since waiting or postponing the price quote always
yields higher proÞts. Further, any unilateral deviation from leadership or followership
is never proÞtable. Therefore, this game has two strict Nash equilibria for all possible
product qualities. Standard reÞnements like perfectness, properness, or strategic
stability do not select among strict Nash equilibria. In addition to this, each Þrms
prefers the equilibrium in which it follows, thus none of the two equilibria Pareto
dominates the other one. Nevertheless, there is one solution concept that is typically
used to select among equilibria in this kind of situation, the risk dominance criterion
introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). This criterion selects equilibria by deÞning
a measure for the riskiness of equilibrium points. This is done by calculating for
each equilibrium the gains each player can make by predicting correctly that the
other player will play the respective equilibrium strategy instead of predicting wrongly
(and reacting optimally to this false prediction). Then, the risk dominance criterion
states that the equilibrium with the highest product of the players gains is to be
chosen. Besides the intuition and axiomatisation provided by Harsanyi and Selten
(1988), there are several reasons given in the literature why risk dominance could be
considered a good equilibrium selection criterion. Perhaps the most persuasive one is
that it has well performed in experimental analysis (see Cabrales and Garcia-Fontes
and Motta (2000) and references therein). The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the
appendix.
Proposition 1 For all qualities q1, q2, the risk dominance criterion selects the equi-
librium with the high-quality Þrm setting its price at t0 and the low-quality Þrm setting
its price in t1.
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Before moving to the quality choices in the Þrst stage of the game, some comments on
the coordination game that we used above are in order. We want to argue that this
coordination game should be considered as a strategic equilibrium selection game. To
understand why, take the above model but look at a two stage waiting game for the
two Þrms. In the Þrst stage, Þrms have the choice between either setting a price that
they can not change afterwards or waiting for the second period. In t = 2, all Þrms
that have not set a price in the Þrst stage can do so in this period. After stage 2,
consumers get to know the prices and decide which product to buy. Finally, proÞts
are realised. This type of waiting game seems to be a natural candidate for modelling
price leadership but it has the inconvenient property that all possible orders of moves
can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome, namely simultaneous price setting in
period 1, the high-quality Þrm as price leader or the low-quality Þrm as price leader.
Moreover, it turns out that prices and proÞts in these equilibria coincide with the
price equilibria of the previous section. Therefore, given that equilibrium selection is
needed anyway, we chose to do it in the strategical model proposed by Hamilton and
Slutsky (1990).
3.2.4 Quality competition
In the Þrst stage of the game, Þrms simultaneously choose their qualities without
further costs and anticipate the endogenous price setting order in the second stage.
It is easy to check that the high quality supplier always gains more than the low
quality Þrm. Thus, in our symmetric setting both Þrms would like to choose the
highest possible quality q. But since identical qualities would entail zero proÞts, one
gets two perfectly symmetric Nash equilibria. One in which Þrm 1 offers q and Þrm
2 a best response to it and one with reversed roles. Let us assume, without loss
of generality that Þrm 1 is the high-quality supplier and offers the highest possible
quality q. Firm 2 responds optimally to this quality by maximising Π122 (q1 = q, q2)
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from (3.7) with respect to q2. It follows that
Proposition 2 In a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, Þrm 1 chooses q∗1 = q and
Þrm 2 chooses q∗2 =
2
3
q.
The low-quality Þrm has an incentive to evade price competition by increasing product
differentiation. In the subgame perfect equilibrium in which the high-quality Þrm is
price leader in the second stage, the low-quality Þrm optimally chooses a quality that
is 2
3
of the highest possible quality. In order to compare this equilibrium outcome
with situations in which another price setting order would be implemented in the
second period, we will give the optimal quality choices for these subgames in
Remark 2 If Þrms were to choose prices simultaneously in the second stage, the low-
quality Þrm would choose qsim2 =
4
7
q h 0, 571q and if the low quality supplier would
act as price leader, it would set q212 = (2−
√
2)q h 0, 585q in the Þrst stage.
Thus, with simultaneous price setting in the short run, Þrms choose the highest degree
of product differentiation since price competition is most intense. If they anticipate
that they will set prices sequentially, they will decrease product differentiation with
the low-quality Þrm choosing a higher quality. In this sense, average product quality
is maximised when Þrms can agree on price leadership of the high-quality Þrm.
Interestingly, the different quality choices under the different price setting orders in
the second period lead to a change in the price and proÞts ranking of Remark 1.
Plugging the optimal qualities into the second period prices, we now get
Remark 3 Comparing equilibrium prices under the different price setting regimes
with endogenous qualities yields
p121 (1, q
12
2 ) = p
21
1 (1, q
21
2 ) = p
sim
1 (1, q
sim
2 )
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and
p212 (1, q
21
2 ) > p
12
2 (1, q
12
2 ) > p
sim
2 (1, q
sim
2 ).
Now compare Remark 1 and 3. For given exogenous qualities the high-quality charged
higher prices under sequential moves. But this price difference is outweighed when
quality is endogenised and Þrms anticipate the price equilibrium they play in the
short run. This effect beomces important when looking at welfare in the next section.
3.2.5 Welfare
Let us Þnally assess the consequences of the above results for the economys welfare.
In particular, we are interested in comparing the welfare levels for the overall game
for the different orders of move in the second stage. DeÞne consumer surplus CS as
the sum of all consumers utility. Thus,
CS(p1, p2, q1, q2) =
Z eθ
p2
q2
(θq2 − p2)dθ +
Z 1
eθ (θq1 − p1)dθ. (3.10)
The total welfare W of the economy is the sum of consumer surplus and the Þrms
proÞts,
W = CS +Π1 +Π2 (3.11)
Proposition 3 compares these measures for the cases of sequential and simultaneous
price setting in the second period.
Proposition 3 It holds that
CS1,2 > CSsim > CS2,1
and
W 2,1 > W sim > W 1,2.
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Proposition 3 states our main result. Price leadership in the short run can be beneÞcial
to consumers and society when it affects Þrms long term variables which are in this
case product qualities. More speciÞcally, consumers are best off under the derived
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, i.e. in the equilibrium in which the high-quality
Þrm takes the lead in the price setting game. The loss in the intensity of price
competition through sequential moves is made up by the increased average product
quality in the economy. It is easy to see from Proposition 3 (but also derived in the
appendix) that the sum of the Þrms proÞts is higher in the two other price subgames.
With equal weights for consumers and Þrms rents, the Þrms losses outweigh the
consumers gains and the overall economy would be better off if Þrms chose their
prices simultaneously or if the low quality Þrm took the lead.
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3.3 Price leadership in markets with consumers
switching costs
3.3.1 The Model
We consider an industry with two (active) Þrms, i = 1, 2, that produce a non-storable
good at a constant and identical unit cost which, for simplicity, is assumed to be zero.
Demand is derived from a continuum of consumers with mass 1 who are differentiated
along two dimensions, purchase history and brand switching costs. In particular,
we will assume that a fraction α of all consumers has previously bought Þrm 1s
product while the remaining (1 − α) consumers purchased Þrm 2s product. In all
what follows, we will consider Þrm 1 as the Þrm with the large customer base, thus
we assume that 1
2
≤ α < 1. Although the two products are functionally identical,
previous consumption of one of the goods creates some kind of lock-in and we assume
that consumers differ in their costs s of switching from the previously bought brand
to the new one. More precisely, let us suppose that the switching costs of consumers
are uniformly distributed on the interval [0, σ], with σ > 0. Hence, for any s0 in
[0, σ], the mass of brand 1 consumers whose switching costs are not larger than s0 is
given by 1
σ
αs0 and σ/2 is the average switching cost in the industry. Figure 3.2 below
illustrates the initial consumer distributions.
In the considered time span, each consumer buys one unit of the product. If he opts
to buy his previous brand again, he gets a net utility of
Uii = −pi, (3.12)
where i = 1, 2 and pi is the price that Þrm i charges. If a consumer with switching
costs s who has previously bought brand i switches to brand j, i 6= j, he gets
Uij(s) = −pj − s. (3.13)
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Figure 3.2: Initial consumer distribution
We assume that α, σ are common knowledge but that Þrms are unable to determine
to which group any given consumer belongs, i.e. interpersonal price discrimination
with respect to s is not possible.
The time structure of the model is as follows. First, we endogenise the price lead-
ership by assuming a timing subgame in which Þrms choose the time of their price
commitment. Then, Þrms set their prices accordingly and Þnally, consumers choose
one of the two brands or the outside option of value 0. We look for subgame perfect
Nash equilibria of this game and solve the model backwards.
We will start by deriving the demand for both Þrms for any given prices p1, p2. If one
Þrm sets a lower price than its rival, it will attract some or all of its rivals previous
customers. The size of this ßow depends on the price difference, the average switching
costs and the size of the customer base of the Þrm with the higher price. Suppose
that p1 < p2, then Þrm 1 will induce all his old customers to repeat purchases and get
all customers from Þrm 2s base with switching costs s ≤ p2−p1. Equivalently, if Þrm
1 charges a higher than Þrm 2, it will lose customers from his base with switching
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costs lower than p1 − p2. Thus, Þrm 1s demand is
D1(p1, p2) =

1 if p1 < p2 − σ,
α+ (1− α)p2−p1
σ
if p2 − σ ≤ p1 ≤ p2,
α− α p1−p2
σ
if p2 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 + σ,
0 if p1 > p2 + σ,
(3.14)
while Þrm 2 serves the remaining customers and has a demand of
D2(p1, p2) =

1 if p2 < p1 − σ,
(1− α) + αp1−p2
σ
if p1 − σ ≤ p2 ≤ p1,
(1− α)(1− p2−p1
σ
) if p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p1 + σ,
0 if p2 > p1 + σ.
. (3.15)
Note that both Þrms demand schedules are continuous and piecewise linear. Inter-
estingly, Þrm 1s demand is concave while Þrm 2s demand is convex. This is due to
the fact that at equal prices p1 = p2, a price cut from Þrm 1 attracts less consumers
from the small base Þrm than a similar price cut of Þrm 2 would do. Or, equivalently,
price increases have a stronger effect on both Þrms demand as long as the marginal
consumer belongs to the large Þrms customer base.
3.3.2 Simultaneous Price Setting
With the above demand functions, we can now proceed to determine the optimal
price Ri(pj) that Þrm i sets in response to any price pj of its rival. Thus, we have to
solve for both Þrms, i = 1, 2, the following maximisation problem
max
pi
piDi(pi, pj). (3.16)
Consider the problem of Þrm 1 and check that it follows from (3.14) that we have four
(possible) local maxima that can qualify for a global optimum. The interior solution
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for all p2 − σ ≤ p1 ≤ p2 is given by
R11(p2) ≡
ασ + (1− α)p2
2(1− α) ,
with a maximum value of (ασ+(1−α)p2)
2
4(1−α)σ . The interior, local maximiser for all p2 ≤ p1 ≤
p2 + σ is at
R21(p2) ≡
σ + p2
2
,
which implies proÞts of α(σ+p2)
2
4σ
. Further, we have two (candidate) corner solutions
at p1 = p2 − σ, i.e. when Þrm 1 grabs the whole market and at p1 = p2 where
no consumers switches. It follows from straight comparison of the respective local
maximum values that Þrm 1s reaction function consists of four parts. If p2 ≤ σ, Þrm
1 optimally chooses a price that is higher than the price of his rival and lets some of
his previous consumers switch. For intermediate values of p2, it just meets the price
of Þrm 2 and keeps all his previous customers. If Þrm 2s price is higher than ασ
(1−α) ,
then it undercuts its rival and attracts some customers from its base and Þnally, if p2
exceeds 2−α
1−ασ, Þrm 1 grabs the whole market. Hence, we have
R1(p2) =

R21(p2) if p2 ≤ σ,
p2 if σ < p2 ≤ α(1−α)σ,
R11(p2) if
α
(1−α)σ < p2 ≤ 2−α1−ασ,
p2 − σ if p2 > 2−α1−ασ.
(3.17)
Firm 2s maximisation problem is similar, although the solution will be qualitatively
different. The local maximiser for p2 in [p1− σ, p1], i.e. if Þrm 2 undercuts its rival is
at
R12(p1) ≡
(1− α)σ + αp1
2α
and the local maximiser for p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p1 + σ is given by
R22(p1) ≡
σ + p1
2
.
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Together with the corner solutions p2 = p1 − σ and p2 = p1, we again have four
candidates for the global maximiser. Straightforward computations give the local
maximum values for the interior solutions as ((1−α)σ+αp1)
2
4ασ
and (1−α)(σ+p1)
2
4σ
respectively.
Comparing them with the corner maxima yields
R2(p1) =

pR2b(p1) if p1 ≤
q
1−α
α
σ,
pR2a(p1) if
q
1−α
α
σ < p2 ≤ 1+αα σ,
p1 − σ if p1 > 1+αα σ.
(3.18)
By contrast to Þrm 1s reaction function, the Þrm with the small customer base has
a disontinuity in its best response schedule. At p1 =
p
(1− α)/ασ, it is indifferent
between charging a low price and cutting into Þrm 1s customer base and a rather
high price which would entail the loss of some of its own customers. This discontinuity
stems from the fact that Þrm 2s demand is convex in p2. At equal prices p2 = p1, a
marginal price decrease attracts α consumers from Þrm 1s base while a marginal price
increases makes only 1-α of its own consumers switch. Thus, the kink in D2(p1, p2)
makes both the low- and the high-price strategy attractive for the Þrm with the small
customer base. This discussion is summarised with the plot of the reaction functions
in Figure 3.3.
Let us now analyse the price equilibrium when Þrms post their prices simultaneously.
Proposition 4 When the Þrms post their prices simultaneously, the unique equilib-
rium is given by
psim1 =
1 + α
3α
σ and psim2 =
2− α
3α
σ.
The corresponding equilibrium proÞts are
Πsim1 =
(1 + α)2
9α
σ and Πsim2 =
(2− α)2
9α
σ.
As illustrated in Figure 3.3, the unique intersection of the Þrms reaction functions is
in the regime where Þrm 1s price is higher than Þrm 2s price. This follows directly
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Figure 3.3: Firms reaction functions
from two observations. First, at its discontinuity R2(p1) jumps down to a price that is
smaller than p1 but always larger than the value at this point of the inverted reaction
function of Þrm 1. And second, for all p1 > psim1 , both functions are continuous, with
R2(p1) never having a steeper slope than the inverted reaction function of Þrm 1.
Therefore, in any equilibrium with simultaneous price moves, p1 > p2 and consumers
with low switching costs will change from Þrm 1 to Þrm 2.
Let us look at the interesting comparative statics of this equilibrium. First, notice
that equilibrium prices and proÞts of both Þrms decrease as the base of the large
Þrm increases. With customer bases of almost equal size, both Þrms have a stronger
incentive to exploit their own base with rather high prices. This strategy becomes
less proÞtable for the smaller Þrm when markets become unequal and it is more and
more tempting to cut into the large customer base of its rival. Hence, unequal market
shares foster price competition and hurt both Þrms.
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Second, the difference in equilibrium prices between the large and the small Þrm is
psim1 − psim2 =
2α− 1
3α
σ
and increases when more customers are initially attached to Þrm 1. This relies on
two effects. A larger customer base turns Þrm 1 into a fat cat in the sense that it is
more inclined to exploit its locked-in customers with a high price. At the same time,
the small Þrm becomes increasingly aggressive and cuts its price. Taken together,
the more unequal the two Þrms are, the higher the price difference and the more
consumers will switch from the large to the small Þrm. Consequently, the size of the
customer bases converges. Nevertheless, check that for all α ≥ 1/2, the proÞts of
the large base Þrm are always higher than those of the small base Þrm and that this
difference is also increasing in α.
By contrast, it is straightforward to verify that higher consumers switching costs
hamper competition and help Þrms to sustain higher prices and proÞts. And, last
but not least, it is noteworthy that we get equilibria in pure strategies for all values
of α and σ, which is by no means common in models with simultaneous pricing and
consumers switching costs.
3.3.3 Firm 1 as price leader
When the Þrm with the larger customer base posts its price Þrst, it takes into account
the optimal reaction of his rival from (3.18). If it sets a price lower than
p
(1− α)/ασ,
the Þrm with the smaller customer base will respond with a higher price and give up
some of its previous consumers with low switching costs. If the posted price of Þrm 1
exceeds this threshold, its rival will respond with price cutting and consumers switch
in the opposite direction. Plugging (3.18) into (3.16) gives the following proÞt function
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for Þrm 1,
Πlead1 (p1) ≡ p1

(1+α)σ−(1−α)p1
2σ
if p1 ≤
q
1−α
α
σ,
(1+α)σ−αp1
2σ
if p1 >
q
1−α
α
σ.
(3.19)
Some remarks on this function which is depicted in Figure 3.4 are in order. First,
the demand is more price elastic in the second part of this function, i.e. when Þrm
1s price will be undercut by its rival. Second, this function has a discontinuity
at p1 = σ
p
(1− α)/α, where the followers price cut leads to a downward jump in
demand and proÞts of the price leader. Finally, note that Πlead1 (p1) has two local
maxima, one at a price below or equal to the threshold price, at which the small base
Þrm would start cutting into Þrm 1s customer base and one for a relatively high
price, at which Þrm 1 would lose some of its customers with low switching costs.
p1
α
α
σ
)1( −
α
σα
2
)1( +
)( 11 p
leadΠ
Figure 3.4: ProÞts of Þrm 1 as price leader for α = 0, 6 and σ = 0, 4.
This trade-off between exploiting its more attached customers with a high price and
expanding its customer base with a low price is resolved in the following proposition.
The complete proof can be found in the appendix.
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Proposition 5 Assume price leadership of the Þrm with the larger customer base.
Then, the unique price equilibrium is
plead1 =
1 + α
2α
σ and pfollow2 =
3− α
4α
σ,
and the corresponding equilibrium proÞts are
Πlead1 =
(1 + α)2
8α
σ and Πfollow2 =
(3− α)2
16α
σ.
Like in the case of simultaneous price setting, the equilibrium is in the regime where
the large base Þrm sets a higher price than the smaller base Þrm. Hence, consumers
switch from Þrm 1 to Þrm 2. Moreover, this equilibrium displays similar comparative
statics, i.e. prices and proÞts fall if the base of the larger Þrm increases and they rise
with higher average switching costs of consumers. The price difference is
plead1 − pfollow2 =
3α− 1
4α
σ,
which again increases with α. Note however, that under price leadership of the large
Þrm, the smaller one can earn higher proÞts than its rival whenever α < 4
√
2− 5 ≈
0.6568. This is due to the fact that being undercut as a price leader is the more
detrimental, the less attached consumers a Þrm has.
3.3.4 Firm 2 as price leader
Finally, we look at the case where the Þrm with the smaller installed base posts its
price Þrst. Again, the leader takes into account the reaction of the follower. From
(3.17) we know that for small prices p2 ≤ σ, Þrm 1 will react with a higher price
and exploit its old customers with high switching costs. For intermediate prices, it
will exactly meet the leaders price and induce repeat purchases from its customer
base. For sufficiently high prices of the leader, the large base Þrm 1 will undercut and
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attract new customers. Therefore, Þrm 2s proÞt function as a price leader is
Πlead2 (p2) = p2

(2−α)σ−αp2
2σ
if p2 ≤ σ,
1− α if σ < p2 ≤ α(1−α)σ,
(2−α)σ−(1−α)p2
2σ
if p2 > α(1−α)σ.
(3.20)
As depicted in Figure 3.5, this function has no discontinuity and is concave. Further it
is easy to check that, by contrast to (3.19), the small Þrms demand as price leader is
more price elastic when its own price is low, i.e. when Þrm 2 cuts into its rivals large
customer base and consumers switch from 1 to 2. For higher prices, price increases
induce the loss of Þrm 2s own, small customer base.

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leadΠ
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Figure 3.5: ProÞts of the small base Þrm for α = 0, 6 and σ = 0, 6.
Again, the price leader considers two possible strategies. Either quoting a low price
and forcing the follower to yield some of its customers or to post a high price and
giving up its own customers with low switching costs. Solving the corresponding
maximisation problem for Þrm 2 entails the characterisation of local maxima and the
identiÞcation of a global maximum. This is delegated to the appendix, the result is
given in
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Proposition 6 Assume price leadership of the Þrm with the smaller customer base.
Then, we get as unique price equilibria
pfollow1 =

(2+α)
4(1−α)σ if α ≤ 2/3,
α
(1−α)σ if α > 2/3
and plead2 =

(2−α)
2(1−α)σ if α ≤ 2/3,
α
(1−α)σ if α > 2/3.
The corresponding equilibrium proÞts are
Πfollow1 =

(2+α)2
16(1−α)σ if α ≤ 2/3,
α2
(1−α)σ if α > 2/3
and Πlead2 =

(2−α)2
8(1−α)σ if α ≤ 2/3,
ασ if α > 2/3.
The equilibrium with the small Þrm as a price leader is qualitatively different from
the two others described above. First, in equilibrium, the large base Þrm never sets a
higher price than its rival, i.e. the large Þrm will not lose customers. While for rather
small differences in the size of the customer base (an α close to 1/2), the following,
large Þrm has an incentive to cut into the small Þrms base, a large initial base makes
Þrm 1 fat and he will just meet the leaders price to retain his customers. By this,
the price difference is in this case
pfollow1 − plead2 =

(3α−2)
4(1−α)σ if α ≤ 2/3,
0 if α > 2/3,
which is decreasing in absolute terms if the customer base advantage of Þrm 1 in-
creases. However, notice that increasing Þrm 1s base α and increasing the switching
costs σ have a positive effect on prices and proÞts of both Þrms. In the following
section, we will compare prices and proÞts of the three pricing subgames and analyse
the endogenous choice of price leadership.
3.3.5 Endogenous Price Leadership
In this section, we will examine the endogenous determination of the timing of price
announcements. But let us Þrst compare the results of the three price subgames
derived in the previous section. The following lemma looks at Þrms prices
Endogenous Price Leadership 65
Lemma 2 If 1
2
≤ α <
√
7−1
3
' 0.5486, we get for the Þrm with the larger customer
base that
plead1 > p
follow
1 > p
sim
1
else it holds that
pfollow1 > p
lead
1 > p
sim
1 .
For the Þrm with the smaller base, it always holds that
plead2 > p
follow
2 > p
sim
2 .
Note Þrst that simultaneous price setting always entails the lowest prices in the econ-
omy. Second, being a follower in the price moves makes Þrms aggressive since they
have the last say and can grab the other Þrms market. Nevertheless, this price cutting
is anticipated by the leader and the more hungry the follower, the more cautious
the leader will be. Therefore, the small Þrm will set a higher price as leader than as
follower for two reasons: Þrst, it expects a fat follower when it leads and second,
it is itself aggressive when it follows. For the large base Þrms, we have to distinguish
two cases. For α close to 1/2, we get the same result as for the small Þrm, the large
Þrm is aggressive when it follows and sets a higher price when it leads. However, a
larger customer base makes the large Þrm softer and the smaller Þrm aggressive and
the price ranking is just reversed.
This argumentation also carries over to the comparison of the price difference under
the different scenarios. Please check that for all relevant α and σ, the price difference
is largest in the subgame where Þrm 1 acts as price leader. In the two remaining cases,
the (absolute) price difference is higher under simultaneous price setting whenever α
is sufficiently large, otherwise it is higher in the subgame with the small Þrm as price
leader.
As a next step, we compare the Þrms proÞts.
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Lemma 3 For the Þrm with the larger customer base it always holds that
Πfollow1 > Π
lead
1 > Π
sim
1 .
If 1
2
≤ α < 0.5942, Þrm 2 has the following ranking:
Πfollow2 > Π
lead
2 > Π
sim
2 ,
otherwise it holds that
Πlead2 > Π
follow
2 > Π
sim
2 .
Lemma 3 states that both Þrms prefer sequential timing to the simultaneous move
equilibrium. For a rather small α, both Þrms would prefer to follow since both of
them fear the aggressivity of the other one as a second-mover. But, as mentioned
before, a large costumer base makes Þrm 1 soft and allows the small Þrm to set a
sufficiently high price as Þrst mover without being undercut. Thus, for α ≥ 0.5942,
the small Þrm strictly prefers to lead in the price game and the large Þrm strictly
prefers to follow.
Let us now proceed to the analysis of the endogenous timing of price announcements
as we did in the Þrst part of this chapter. We look at the same coordination subgame
in which Þrms are assumed to choose their roles. Suppose again that only two
dates of price quoting are possible, t0 and t1 and that Þrms simultaneously commit
to one of these two dates. It is obvious from the previous lemma that Þrms would
never choose the same date since waiting or postponing the price quote always yields
higher proÞts. But although we have a marriage in heaven for high values of α,
we will have two strict Nash equilibria. This is due to the fact that we allow in our
simple timing game for simultaneous moves which gives Þrms no incentive to deviate
from a sequential equilibria and thus both of them qualify for Nash equilibria.
Nevertheless, we can resort again to the risk dominance criterion to select between
these two equilibria. The following proposition summarises the equilibrium analysis.
The proof of this proposition is given in the appendix.
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Proposition 7 For all α ∈ [ 1
2
, 1], the risk dominance criterion selects the equilibrium
with the small customer base Þrm as price leader.
The risk dominance criterion unambiguously selects the equilibrium with the small
Þrm as a price leader for both regimes of Lemma 3, i.e. for the case where both Þrms
prefer to follow and for the case where they agree on price leadership of the small
Þrm.
3.3.6 Welfare
Let us Þnally have a look at welfare in this economy under the different price leader-
ship scenarios. More speciÞcally, we will investigate what price quoting order a social
planner would choose and compare it to the market outcome of the previous section.
DeÞne consumer utility CS as the sum of all consumers utility. If p1 < p2, some
previous consumers of Þrm 2 will switch to Þrm 1 and CS is
CS(p1, p2) |p1<p2 = 1−ασ
p2−p1Z
0
(−p1 − s)ds+ 1−ασ
σZ
p2−p1
(−p2)ds− αp1
= (p2−p1)
2σ
(2ασ + (1− α)(p2 − p1))− p2.
(3.21)
If p1 ≥ p2 consumers switch from Þrm 1 to Þrm 2 and consumer surplus is deÞned as
CS(p1, p2) |p1≥p2 = ασ
p1−p2Z
0
(−p2 − s)ds+ ασ
σZ
p1−p2
(−p1)ds− (1− α)p2
= (p1−p2)
2σ
(−2ασ + α(p1 − p2))− p2.
(3.22)
We deÞne the total welfare W of the economy as the unweighted sum of consumer
surplus and the Þrms proÞts. Since consumers expenditures become Þrms revenues,
all what accounts for social welfare is the sum of consumers switching costs. Thus
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W simpliÞes to
W (p1, p2) = CS(p1, p2) +Π1(p1, p2) +Π2(p1, p2)
=
 −
(1−α)(p2−p1)2
2σ
if p1 < p2,
−α(p1−p2)2
2σ
if p1 ≥ p2.
(3.23)
DeÞne CSsim(W sim), CS1leads(W 1leads) and CS2leads(W 2leads) as consumer surplus
(social welfare) under simultaneous pricing, price leadership of Þrm 1 and price lead-
ership of Þrm 2, respectively. Plugging the results from Proposition 4, 5 and 6 into
(3.21) or (3.22), we get for the consumer surplus under simultaneous price moves
CSsim = −σ(11− 8(1− α)α)
18α
.
When Þrm 1 acts as price leader we have
CS1lead = −σ(23− 5(2− 3α)α)
32α
and with 2 as price leader
CS2lead =
 −
σ(28−5(4−3α)α)
32(1−α) if α ≤ 2/3,
− ασ
(1−α) if α > 2/3.
The total consumer surplus is determined by the absolute price level and the relative
price level which induces costly switching. In this respect, it is obvious from our
previous analysis of the different equilibria that in all three cases, consumer surplus
decrease when average switching costs increase. By contrast, increasing asymmetry
between Þrms customer bases, i.e. a higher α, lowers prices and thus raises consumer
welfare in the setting with simultaneous price quotes and with the large Þrm as leader
but raises prices and lowers surplus when the large Þrm follows.
Equivalently, one can compute the measures for total welfare in the economy which
corresponds to the switching costs that consumers have to incur in the different price
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equilibria. Simple algebra gives
W sim = −σ(1− 2α)
2
18α
, W 1lead = −σ(1− 3α)
2
32α
and (3.24)
W 2lead =
 −
σ(2−3α)2
32(1−α) if α ≤ 2/3,
0 if α > 2/3.
Proposition 8 compares the measures for consumer surplus and total welfare.
Proposition 8 Consumers have the ranking
CSsim > CS1leads > CS2leads.
The socially efficient ranking for 1
2
≤ α < 0, 5963 is
W sim > W 2leads > W 1leads
and
W 2leads > W sim > W 1leads
otherwise.
The maximisation of consumers surplus has to take into account the price difference
and the price levels of the different scenarios. From the above discussion of the
corresponding equilibrium prices, it is easy to see that simultaneous price setting
offers consumers the best deal with respect to price levels and the second best with
respect to price differences, which translate into switching costs that consumers have
to incur. Nevertheless, the absolute price levels dominate this ranking which is just
the reverse order of the Þrms price ranking of Lemma 2.
Contrarily to that, all what counts for total welfare is the price difference in the three
pricing scenarios. The higher the price difference, the more consumers will incur
switching costs and change to the low price Þrm. Thus, social welfare is maximised
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either under simultaneous price setting (for α close to 1/2) or under leadership of the
small Þrm (for sufficiently large α). This is simply due to the fact that - as we already
argued - the large Þrm has less of an incentive to undercut when it follows because it
has to apply a low price to its locked-in customers, too. The higher α, the stronger
the incentive to meet the posted price of the small Þrm and the less consumers have
to switch.
Finally, it follows directly from Proposition 4 and 5 that for rather symmetric cus-
tomer bases price leadership arises although simultaneous pricing would be socially
optimal. However, for sufficiently large α, the endogenisation of price moves generates
the socially optimal order for α > 0, 5963.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter contains two notes on models of endogenous price leadership. In the
Þrst one, we analysed a vertically differentiated industry and found that under price
competition the high and the low-quality supplier would both prefer to follow but
that the risk dominance criterion unambiguously selects the high quality Þrm as a
price leader. The reason for this is that the high quality Þrm has a higher potential
to undercut its low quality rival and this latter has therefore more of an incentive to
outwait the price quote of the former. More importantly and completely independent
of the price equilibrium selection we showed that the emergence of price leadership
softens the competitive pressure in the industry with the result that in the long run
Þrms would choose products of higher quality and decrease product differentiation.
Taken together, we demonstrated that price leadership may actually hurt Þrms but
beneÞt consumers.
Notice that the results of the Þrst note are conÞrmed by at least two empirical studies
on price leadership. Roy and Hanssens and Raju (1994) examined the mid-size sedan
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segment of the US automobile market and found evidence that the high end car Ford
Thunderbird acted as a price leader to Chryslers New Yorker for the duration of the
study (28 years). Kadiyali and Vilcassim and Chintagunta (1996) investigated the
market for liquid laundry detergents and showed that Procter & Gamble and Lever
used their respective upper quality brands as price leaders for the low quality brands
of the industry.
In the second model, we took a closer look at price leadership in markets with con-
sumers switching costs. Deneckere et al. (1992) argued that the size of a Þrms
customer base has the same impact on endogenous price leadership as Þrms produc-
tion capacity has. In our model, we show that this conclusion crucially hinges on
their assumption of prohibitive switching costs. If one allows consumers to switch
suppliers at some positive, but Þnite cost, the Þrm with the larger segment of loyal
customers stands to lose more by being undercut since its smaller rival faces a higher
(absolute) demand elasticity and less own customers over which to spread the lower
price when it follows. In this vein, we demonstrate that industries with consumers
switching costs provide a natural example for a constellation that has - to the best
of our knowledge - not yet been found in the literature: one Þrm strictly prefers to
lead and the other one strictly prefers to follow. Moreover, we can show that the
market outcome, which is price leadership of the small Þrm, minimises consumers
switching costs and is the socially efficient order of price quotes over a large range of
parameters.
Finally, from a conceptual point of view, we presented a model of an industry with
consumers switching costs that explicitly allows for closed form solutions and unique
equilibria in pure strategies. Both properties are rather the exception in this strand
of literature.
To conclude, notice that a relevant market for which there have been empirical studies
on price leadership is the US cigarette market. Scherer and Ross (1990) report that
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during 1921 and 1965 market share leader Reynolds (Camel) seemed to be more
reluctant to lead price decreases than its rivals American and Liggett & Myers.
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3.5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 1, we know that only two equilibria in pure strategies can exist, (t0, t1)
and (t1, t0), where the dates denote the point in time at which Þrm 1 and Þrm 2
will quote their price. Following Harsanyi & Selten (1988), we will say that the
former equilibrium risk dominates the latter whenever G121 G
12
2 > G
21
1 G
21
2 , with G
12
1 ≡
Π121 − Πsim1 , G122 ≡ Π122 − Πsim2 , G211 ≡ Π211 − Πsim1 and G212 ≡ Π212 − Πsim2 . Tedious
calculations show that
G121 G
12
2 −G211 G212 =
(q1 − q2)2q41(8q1 − q2)
128(2q1 − q2)3(4q1 − q2)2 > 0.
Hence, (t0, t1) is the risk dominant equilibrium in the above sense. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3
Consumer surplus is deÞned in (3.10). With (3.4), we get the consumer surplus when
prices are set simultaneously
CSsim(q1, q2) =
Z 2q1−q2
4q1−q2
q1−q2
4q1−q2
(θq2 − p2)dθ +
Z 1
2q1−q2
4q1−q2
(θq1 − p1)dθ = q
2
1(4q1 + 5q2)
2(4q1 − q2)2 .
If the low quality Þrm would be the second stage price leader, one would have, using
(3.8),
CS2,1(q1, q2) =
Z 4q1−3q2
8q1−4q2
q1−q2
4q1−2q2
(θq2 − p2)dθ +
Z 1
4q1−3q2
8q1−4q2
(θq1 − p1)dθ
=
4q21(4q1 + 3q2) + 3q
2
2(q2 − 5q1)
32(2q1 − q2)2 .
and similarly with the high quality Þrm as price leader and (3.6)
CS1,2(q1, q2) =
Z 1
2
q1−q2
4q1−2q2
(θq2 − p2)dθ +
Z 1
1
2
(θq1 − p1)dθ = q1(4q1 + q1q2 − q
2
2)
8(2q1 − q2)2 .
Plugging in the optimal qualities from Proposition 2 and Remark 2 yields
CSsim = 0, 29166, CS2,1 = 0, 28888, CS1,2 = 0, 296875.
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For the Þrms proÞts, one gets
Π21 = Π211 +Π
21
2 = (7− 3
√
2) = 0, 17233,
Π12 = Π121 +Π
12
2 =
1
8
+ 1
32
= 0, 15625,
Πsim = Πsim1 +Π
sim
2 =
7
48
+ 1
48
= 0, 16.
And Þnally, it is straightforward to calculate the total welfare in the different regimes
W sim = 0, 45833,W 2,1 = 0, 4611,W 1,2 = 0, 4531.¥
Proof of Proposition 5
First, check that (piecewise) concavity and the downward discontinuity of the proÞt
function gives rise to three potential local maxima. First, the interior solution for
0 < p1 ≤ σ
p
(1− α)/α, which is at p1 = 1+α2(1−α)σ and which is larger than the upper
threshold value σ
p
(1− α)/α of this region for all α ≥ 1/2. Therefore, the local
maximum in this price regime is exactly at the threshold value p1 = σ
p
(1− α)/αand
takes a value of (1 + α)σ
p
α(1− α)/2α − (1−α)2
2α
. The third local maximum can be
found for p1 >
p
(1− α)/ασ. Taking the Þrst order condition of the second part of
Πlead1 (p1) yields p1 =
1+α
2α
σ and a maximum value of (1+α)
2
8α
σ. Comparing the local
maximum values and plugging the optimal price for Þrm 1 in R2(p1) and in the proÞt
functions gives Proposition 5. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6
Note Þrst that the proÞt function is continuous and (piecewise) concave. Solving
the maximisation problem of Þrm 2 again implies the identiÞcation of local maxima.
First, consider the price regime 0 < p2 ≤ σ. The Þrst order condition of this Þrst part
of the proÞt function yields p2 = 2−α2α σ, which is smaller than σ whenever α ≥ 2/3.
Thus, for 1/2 < α < 2/3, the local maximum is the corner solution p2 = σ, otherwise
it is at 2−α
2α
σ with a maximum value of (2−α)
2
8α
σ.
For σ < p2 < α(1−α)σ, the proÞt function is strictly increasing in p2, therefore a second
local maximum may only be found for p2 > α(1−α)σ. Deriving the Þrst order condition
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for the third part of Πlead2 (p2) and solving it, gives p2 =
(2−α)
2(1−α)σ with a maximum value
of (2−α)
2
8(1−α)σ. This solution is interior as long as
(2−α)
2(1−α)σ >
α
(1−α)σ or 1/2 < α < 2/3.
Otherwise, for α > 2/3, the local maximum is at α
(1−α)σ.
To sum up, for 1/2 < α < 2/3, the unique local maximum is (2−α)
2(1−α)σ. For α ≥ 2/3, the
proÞts at 2−α
2α
σ are always larger than those at α
(1−α)σ. Plugging these optimal prices
into the reaction function of Þrm 1 and into the proÞt functions gives Proposition 6.¥
Proof of Proposition 7
Following Harsanyi and Selten (1988), we will say that the equilibrium with Þrm 1 as
follower risk dominates the equilibrium with 1 as price leader whenever Gfollow1 G
lead
2 ≥
Glead1 G
follow
2 , with G
lead
1 ≡ Πlead1 − Πsim1 , Gfollow2 ≡ Πfollow2 − Πsim2 , Gfollow1 ≡ Πfollow1 −
Πsim1 and G
lead
2 ≡ Πlead2 −Πsim2 . Tedious calculations show that
Gfollow1 G
lead
2 −Glead1 Gfollow2 =
Z(α, σ) ≡

(1−2α)(24α5−45α4−86α3+103α2+140α−55)
1152α2(1−α)2 σ
2 if α ≤ 2/3,
(1+α)(1137α4−454α3−168α2−58α+55)
1152α2(1−α) σ
2 if α > 2/3.
Finally, check that Z(1/2, σ) = 0, that it is monotonically increasing for a ∈ [1/2, 1]
and that Z(α, σ)→∞ for α→ 1. Thus, Z(α, σ) ≥ 0 for all σ and a ∈ [1/2, 1]. ¥
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Chapter 4
Agglomeration in R&D Intensive
Industries
4.1 Introduction
When selecting amongst portfolios of alternative product speciÞcations, under which
conditions do Þrms tend to agglomerate and thus seek competition instead of look-
ing for a market niche they can supply monopolistically? Similarly, what are the
characteristics of Þrms and products that lead Þrms to agglomerate in geographical
space, vs. those that lead Þrms to seek a solitary location? How do the incentives
to agglomerate in product, or geographical spaces change with exogeneities, such as
transaction costs and differences in consumers taste? Are the tendencies towards
agglomeration (or dispersion) in harmony, or in disharmony with those leading the
social planner to propose agglomeration vs. dispersion?
Questions of this nature have been addressed in a long string of literature. Within the
new industrial economics emerging from the seventies, many authors have analysed
variants of Hotellings seminal (1929) paper. The question of agglomeration also
features centrally in the New Economic Geography. Yet, to our surprise, while there
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is ample empirical documentation at least of agglomeration in geographical space with
Silicon Valley and Route 128 as the most prominent examples for the agglomeration
of innovative hi-tech industry, little has been said to date in the theoretical literature
about the relationship between Þrms innovative activity and their incentives towards
agglomeration.
The interest in this issue is far from being only of a theoretical nature - in particular
when it comes to the geographical interpretation of these questions. Geographical
agglomerations of innovative industrial activity are thought to contribute particularly
much to the generation of employment, and indeed, to lead the growth path of entire
national economies. Take again Silicon Valley as an example. In spite of ups and
downs in employment demand during the nineties of the last century, the employment
growth rate in Silicon Valley outpaced with an impressive 15 per cent the U.S. national
employment growth rate and the mean personal income per head was up to 50 per cent
higher than the corresponding national income Þgure (Audretsch, 1998). Yet it is fair
to ask whether a dispersion of these activities could induce not only a more equitable
allocation, but could also increase the efficiency in the allocation of economic activity.
It is thus of utmost importance to investigate, and to evaluate in detail the reasons
for such agglomerations to form.
More speciÞcally, the question is as to the strategic forces that lead these innovative
Þrms to choose locations close to each other, and thus to opt for aggressive competition
in either input, or output markets or both, rather than to evade it. The story in favor
of agglomeration in the geographical case proposed by data analysts e.g. by Saxenian
(1994), Harhoff (1995), Audretsch and Feldman (1995, 1996) or Audretsch (1998) is
that Þrms seek to partake in an information rich environment: Þrms beneÞt from
clustering together because tacit knowledge is transmitted either in informal contacts
between employees of different Þrms, or via the movement of these employees across
Þrms.1
1Knowledge spillovers through employee mobility have been studied by Fosfuri et al. (1999) and
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Our explanation of agglomeration in innovative industries does not build on spillovers
but on the inherent stochasticity of R&D activities. In the vein of Hotellings clas-
sical paper Þrms location choices are governed by the trade-off between two by now
standard effects: a demand effect that induces the individual Þrm to move towards
the center of the market, and a competition effect that drives the Þrms away from
each other. For symmetric and certain product qualities and quadratic transporta-
tion costs, we know from the principle of maximum differentiation established by
dAspremont and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) that the competition effect always
dominates and that Þrms locate at the opposite ends of the line. However, if market
entry (or product quality) depends on the stochastic outcome of Þrms R&D activities,
a Þrm meets a successful competitor in the market only with a certain probability.
This weakens the competition effect while the demand effect remains unchanged. In
the Þrst part of this work, we show in a simple variant of the Hotelling framework
that this can actually lead to complete agglomeration of Þrms in the center of the
market. From a welfare point of view, Þrms choose too much concentration (disper-
sion) if innovation probabilities are low (high). Moreover, we investigate the impact of
R&D spillovers and patent protection on the location equilibrium. We show that the
former is actually working against agglomeration because it increases the probability
that Þrms end up in a duopoly while patent protection leads to more monopolistic
outcomes and therefore constitutes an agglomerative force in our model.
In the second part, we extend our framework and allow Þrms to choose their R&D
technology together with their location. More speciÞcally, Þrms can adopt either a
safe R&D project yielding a low-quality product or a risky project aiming at a large
innovation step. We show that for a large range of the parameter space the following
three types of equilibria can emerge. Either Þrms choose dispersed locations and
adopt the safe R&D technology. Or, they agglomerate in the center and one of the
Þrms opts for the risky technologies. Or, Þnally, they agglomerate and both choose
Rønde (2000), among others.
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the risky R&D technology. Following the intuition of the Þrst part, this result hints at
a strong complementarity between risk taking in R&D and geographical concentration
of Þrms. Our welfare analysis gives a rather diverse picture. There may be excessive
differentiation and concentration in product space and too less or too much risk taking
in the choice of the R&D technology.
Finally, our model allows an interesting reinterpretation in terms of the labour market
pooling argument forwarded by Marshall (1920). He argued that Þrms might have
incentives to locate in the same region when they face stochastic labour demands that
are imperfectly correlated. By this, the Þrm with the high demand can draw skilled
labour at low cost from the common local labour market since the labour demand
of the other Þrm is low. In a straightforward reformulation of our product market
model, Þrm-speciÞc shocks to the labour demand are generated by the stochastic
R&D technology. And when Þrms choose locations they have to trade off labour
market competition and access to labour (which is cheapest in the center of the line).
To clearify this reinterpretation, we will explicitly formulate the model variant of the
Þrst part of our work from this input market perspective.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two papers linking location decisions in
the geographical interpretation to innovation issues and both have spillovers as the
unique agglomerative force. Gersbach and Schmutzler (1999) analyse agglomeration
due to localised technological spillovers within a discrete location framework. They
explicitly look at a model in which Þrms are not only recipients of positive spillovers,
but they may also be the victim of undesired information leakages. Their focus
is on the interplay between internal interplant spillovers as well as external interÞrm
spillovers from cost reducing R&D efforts on the plant location decisions of duopolistic
Þrms. Abstracting from the price competition stage, they compare in detail the
reduced form proÞts net of the Þxed costs of establishing a plant and of (certain)
innovation, to arrive at what they call research centre, or alternatively, technology
sourcing equilibria that differ by the fact that in the former, both Þrms exercise
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innovation efforts, while in the latter, only one Þrm does this.
Mai and Peng (1999) concentrate on an explicit form of co-operation between Þrms as
the explicit reason for agglomerations to form. They modify the Hotelling-framework
by assuming that distance dependent communication between competitors reduces
production costs. In their model, the Þrms will symmetrically move the closer to
each other, the stronger the cost reducing effect of communication, and the more
drastic the increase in communication costs with distance. However, the Þrms will
fully agglomerate only if the positive externality is inÞnitely large.
The literature on clustering in product space is much richer. For instance, Bester
(1998) and Vettas (1999) look at a situation where Þrms signal the quality of their
products to imperfectly informed consumers and show how this might lead to ag-
glomeration. The authors use a set-up similar to ours, with horizontal product dif-
ferentiation as well as vertical quality differences. Vettas looks at a location model
in which one Þrm sells an exogenously speciÞed low quality product, whilst the other
one sells a high quality product. He shows that by locating close to the low quality
Þrm, the high quality Þrm can signal the superiority of the quality offered, whilst
the low quality Þrm seeks a niche location. Bester looks at model where it is more
costly to produce high quality than low quality. He shows that this leads to a lower
bound on price that the Þrms can charge and still (credibly) commit to supplying high
quality. Therefore, Þrms do not compete away all proÞts as they move close to each
other in the horizontal dimension, and agglomeration might occur in equilibrium. In
our model, consumers can perfectly observe the quality of the products, so signalling
does not play a role. The effects leading to agglomeration in our model are thus quite
different from those in Bester and Vettas.
Within a modiÞed Hotelling framework, Neven and Thisse (1993) and Irmen and
Thisse (1998) demonstrate clustering effects in one of two dimensions of product
differentiation, where one is vertical and the other horizontal, and both are horizontal,
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respectively. Their central point is on sufficient conditions under which (maximal)
product differentiation in one dimension suffices for Þrms to agglomerate in the center
of the market in another dimension, without the effect that proÞts evaporate. Echoing
somewhat this type of results, we show in our model that there exists an equilibrium
where the Þrms choose the same horizontal product characteristic but different R&D
strategies: one Þrm pursues a high risk-high return project whilst the other one
chooses a more conservative R&D strategy.
There are also models on competitive R&D portfolio choices that demonstrate clus-
tering effects, by authors such as Bhattacharya and Mokherjee (1986), Dasgupta and
Maskin (1987), and Cardon and Sasaki (1998), among others. Bhattacharya and
Mokherjee compare private and social incentives towards risk in R&D projects with
winner-takes-all outcomes enforced by a patent mechanism. Their primary interest is
in the exploration of relative levels of risk taking and in correlation choices. Our focus
is different. We are interested in exploring the trade off between Þerce competition
that arises when Þrms locate close to each other and are equally (un-)successful; and
dominant Þrm proÞts if only one succeeds. However, in second part of our work,
we include in a rudimentary way the choice amongst research portfolios according to
risk/return relationships. In doing so, we are able to analyse asymmetric choices be-
tween Þrms, which is not possible in the otherwise more general models by Dasgupta
and Maskin, and Cardon and Sasaki.
There is a large literature analysing market structure in industries with network exter-
nalities. It is shown how network externalities create bandwagon effects that make
Þrms and consumers choose products that are standardized or compatible across Þrms;
see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Farrell and Saloner (1986). Our paper is most
closely related to Katz and Shapiro (1986), who introduce a stochastic R&D technol-
ogy into a network industry. Two generations of homogenous consumers choose which
technology to buy, and the Þrms decide whether to make their proprietary technolo-
gies compatible. The decision to make the products compatible resembles the choice
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of agglomerating in product space, as the products become closer substitutes. Katz
and Shapiro show that the winner in the R&D race beneÞts from compatibility, as
the consumers have a higher willingness to pay for the product. However, the loser is
better off under incompatibility, as she might avoid being pushed out of the market.
Finally, in models in the herding tradition, authors such as Banerjee (1992) or
Hirshleifer et al. (1992) demonstrate imitative behavior within a dynamic framework.
Unlike in our model, imitation is driven here by consumer biases.
There is Þnally a particularly small literature related to the second interpretation of
our model, namely Þrms location decisions in geographical space, relative to localised
labor markets. While authors such as Topel (1986), Baumgardner (1988), or most
recently Picard and Toulemonde (2000) and Combes and Duranton (2000) all focus
on different issues such as workers migration incentives, division of labor as changing
with labor market size, agglomeration as a result of supply elasticity of labor, and
the advantages of labor market pooling vs. the disadvantages of labor poaching,
respectively.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In the next section, we present our
benchmark model, in which an unsuccessful Þrm, while ex ante active, will be inactive
ex post in both, its product market and labor market interpretations. In sections 3 and
4, we determine and characterise the price equilibrium, and the location equilibrium
and welfare outcomes, respectively. In Section 5, we endogenise R&D decisions and
again derive and characterise equilibria and welfare outcomes. In the concluding
section, we summarise our results and speculate about possible extensions.
4.2 The Benchmark Model
The Product Market Interpretation We employ the standard Hotelling (1929)
duopoly model in the version of dAspremont, Gabszewicz & Thisse (1979) with
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quadratic consumer transportation costs. The market area is described by the unit
interval M=[0,1]. There is a unit mass of consumers whose locations are uniformly
distributed over M.
We consider an industry with two Þrms i = A,B potentially active in the market,
that choose locations a, b ∈M , a ≤ b, at which they offer their good. Each consumer
buys at most one unit of the product and incurs costs of overcoming space that are
quadratic in the distance travelled. Thus a consumer located at y derives net utility
UA(a, qA, pA, y) = qA − pA − t(a− y)2
when buying good A and
UB(b, qB, pB, y) = qB − pB − t(y − b)2
when buying B. qi and pi are the quality and the price of Þrm is product, respectively.
t > 0 reßects the degree of consumer heterogeneity or horizontal product differentia-
tion. We assume that all variables are common knowledge in the economy.
We assume that the Þrms costlessly invest in R&D. With probability ρ a Þrms project
succeeds. Then the Þrm sells a product of quality q. The successes of the Þrms are
uncorrelated . In order to make the model tractable, we assume that the Þrms have
no fall-back quality. Therefore, if the project is unsuccessful, the Þrm is, while in the
market, not active. One can think of this as a situation where there are signiÞcant
retooling or marketing costs, so a quick change in the production schedule if the R&D
project is a failure is not possible. We will later consider variations of these assump-
tions, but these will be explained when introduced.
The timing is the following: First, Þrms simultaneously choose their locations (a, b).
Second, the outcomes of their R&D investments are realised. Finally, Þrms set prices
simultaneously, consumers buy one of the available products, and proÞts are realised.
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The Labor Market Interpretation The presentation of the model was thus far
held in the context of horizontal product differentiation. Yet there is another funda-
mentally different, but rather realistic interpretation of the model, running as follows.
Suppose that the Þrms have to locate somewhere in a valley of length one. At each
point in the valley lives one worker endowed with utility function
U(w, x) = w − t(x)2
where w is the wage earned and x is the distance travelled to work. Our two Þrms
hire the workers to produce a vertically differentiated commodity with a one-to-one
production function. The Þrms engage in wage competition once the outcome of R&D
is known. The commodity is sold on a competitive world market, and Firm i sells its
product at price pi = qi.
The product differentiation and local labor market formulations are formally equiva-
lent and thus give rise to precisely the same equations. When interpreting our results
we will refer to the product market interpretation of the model, and come back later
to its labor market interpretation.
4.3 Price Equilibrium for given qualities and loca-
tions
Depending on the outcome of the R&D process after the location is Þxed, the typical
Þrm may produce and sell a product at positive quality, or it may remain inactive if
unsuccessful. If successful, it may either be a monopolist or a duopolist, depending
on the success or failure of its competitor.
In the present stage, the Þrms locations and product qualities are known and taken as
given when they set their prices. First, we derive the monopoly price, and afterwards
the duopoly ones. For future reference, we calculate equilibrium prices and proÞts
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allowing for quality differences between the Þrms products.
4.3.1 The Monopoly Outcome
Suppose that only one Þrm, say Þrm A, located at a ≤ 1
2
succeeded in developing
a marketable product of quality qA. The consumers indifferent between buying the
product at a price pA and not purchasing at all (at opportunity utility of 0) are located
at
ey1 =Max{0, a−rqA − pA
t
} and ey2 =Min{0, a+rqA − pA
t
}.
With this, we can derive Þrm As demand as monopolist, DM(qA, a, pA), which is
given by
DM(qA, a, pA) =

0 if pA > qA
2
q
qA−pA
t
if qA ≥ pA > qA − ta2
a+
q
qA−pA
t
if qA − ta2 ≥ pA > qA − t(1− a)2
1 if pA ≤ qA − t(1− a)2.
The monopolist maximizes his proÞts, pDM(qA, a, p). Lemma 1, which follows from
simply calculating the monopolists proÞt maximum, characterises the solution to this
problem under an assumption that leads the market to be covered under any market
arrangement.
Lemma 1 Let qA ≥ 3t. Then, for all a ∈ [0, 12 ], the monopolist charges the price
pMA = qA − t(1− a)2 and covers the market.
For simplicity, we will in the sequel only consider that situation:
A. 1. The market is covered, qi ≥ 3t.
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Since the monopolist serves all consumers and the total mass of consumers is 1, the
monopoly proÞt ΠM(qA, a) is equivalent to the monopoly price, pMA = qA − t(1− a)2.
Thus,
ΠMA (qA, a) = qA − t(1− a)2.
Suppose instead that Þrm B, located at b ∈ [1
2
, 1], is a monopolist in the market. It
follows from symmetry that under assumption A.1. Þrm B charges the price pMB =
qB − t(b)2 and covers the market.
4.3.2 The Duopoly Outcome
This is the case where both Þrms conduct successful R&D, resulting in qualities qA
and qB, respectively. Let the consumer located at ey be indifferent between buying
from between Þrm A or Þrm B. ey is given as the solution to the following equation:
qA − pA − (ey − a)2 = qB − pB − (b− ey)2.
Solving for ey, we obtain:
ey =Max½0,Min½a+ b
2
− qB − qA + pA − pB
2t(b− a) , 1
¾¾
. (4.1)
By assumption A.1., the market is covered, so Þrm As demand is ey and Þrm Bs
demand is 1 − ey. Firms simultaneously set prices and the corresponding Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium is given in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 (i) For qA−qB < −t(b−a)(2+a+b), Þrm B is the only Þrm with positive
market share. The unique price equilibrium is
pDA(a, b, qA, qB) = 0 and p
D
B(a, b, qA, qB) = qB − qA − t(b2 − a2). (4.2)
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(ii) For −t(b − a)(2 + a + b) < qA − qB < t(b − a)(4 − a − b), the Þrms share the
market. The unique price equilibrium is
pDA(a, b, qA, qB) =
1
3
(qA − qB + t(b− a)(2 + a+ b)) and (4.3)
pDB(a, b, qA, qB) =
1
3
(qB − qA + t(b− a)(4− a− b)).
(iii) For qA − qB > t(b − a)(4 − a − b), Þrm A is the only Þrm with positive market
share. The unique price equilibrium is
pDA(a, b, qA, qB) = qA − qB − t(b− a)(2− a− b) and pDB(a, b, qA, qB) = 0. (4.4)
Proof: See Appendix.
In the proof we derive the reaction functions and show that the price equilibrium is
unique. Not unexpectedly, Lemma 2 demonstrates that if there are quality differences,
the low quality Þrm is dominated by the high quality one if the quality difference is
large relative to the transportation cost t.
Using Lemma 2, we can derive the equilibrium proÞts. In case (i) where Þrm A is
inactive, the proÞts are given as
ΠDB(a, b, qA, qB) = qB − qA − t(b2 − a2) and (4.5)
ΠDA(a, b, qA, qB) = 0.
Similarly, if Þrm B is inactive as in case (iii), the proÞts are
ΠDA(a, b, qA, qB) = qA − qB − t(b− a)(2− a− b) and (4.6)
ΠDB(a, b, qA, qB) = 0.
Finally, in the case where the Þrms share the market, they earn proÞts
ΠDA(a, b, qA, qB) =
(qA − qB + t(b− a)(2 + a+ b))2
18t(b− a) and (4.7)
ΠDB(a, b, qA, qB) =
(qB − qA + t(b− a)(4− a− b))2
18t(b− a) .
This completes the analysis of price competition in the market place.
Agglomeration in R&D Intensive Industries 90
4.4 Location under Stochastic R&D Outcomes
4.4.1 The Equilibrium
We now turn to the Þrms location decisions. They have to take place before the
outcomes of their R&D efforts are known. Each of the Þrms innovates with probability
ρ. If both Þrms are successful, they produce and sell a product of the same quality,
qA = qB = q .Therefore, if actively competing in the market, the Þrms have the same
quality commodity. For given locations, the expected proÞts of the Þrms are:
E(ΠA(a, b, qA, qB, ρ)) = ρ(ρΠ
D
A(a, b, q, q) + (1− ρ)ΠM(q, a)) and
E(ΠB(a, b, qA, qB, ρ)) = ρ(ρΠ
D
B(a, b, q, q) + (1− ρ)ΠM(q, b)).
Using Lemma 1 and equation (4.7), we obtain the Þrst order condition for Þrm A
when choosing its location a:
∂E(ΠA(a, b, qA, qB, ρ))
∂a
=
t
18
¡
36(1− a)− (40 + 3a2 − 2a(14− b)− b2)ρ¢ .
It can be shown that ÞrmAs problem is concave, so solving the equation ∂E(ΠA(a,b,ρ))
∂a
=
0, we Þnd the optimal location of Þrm A as a function of the location of Þrm B. The
reaction function of Þrm A is given as:
RA(b, ρ) =
−36 + 28ρ− 2bρ−p(36− 28ρ+ 2bρ)2 − 12ρ(−36 + 40ρ− b2ρ)
6ρ
.
The reaction function of Þrm B is derived the same way.
Figure 4.1 shows the reaction functions of the two Þrms for ρ = 0.8 (solid) and for
ρ = 0.9 (dashed). It illustrates that the Þrms agglomerate closer to the center of the
market for low values of ρ and separate for higher values. The equilibrium is derived
formally in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Consider the choice of location in the Þrst stage of the game.
i) For ρ ≤ 2
3
, the unique equilibrium locations are a∗ = b∗ = 1
2
.
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Figure 4.1: The reaction functions of Þrm A and B.
ii) For 2
3
< ρ ≤ 1, the unique equilibrium locations for a ≤ b are
a∗ =Max
½
0,
1
2
− Γ
¾
and b∗ = 1− a∗, .
where Γ≡ 3(3ρ−2)
4(3−2ρ) .
Proof: See appendix.
4.4.2 Discussion
The equilibrium outcome can easily be understood in terms of the effects of the
model. On one hand, the typical Þrm wishes to choose a location that captures as
many consumers as possible, as this increases the sales and proÞts for given prices.
This demand effect tends to make the Þrm locate in the centre of the market, as
pointed out by Hotelling (1929). On the other hand, moving towards the centre of
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the market also means moving closer to the other Þrm. This intensiÞes competition,
which reduces proÞts.
DAspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) show that if both Þrms are active with
certainty, the competition effect dominates, so Þrms locate as far as possible from
each other. However, in our model, the Þrms foresee that if they enter the market,
they will only meet an active competitor with probability ρ. This weakens the com-
petition effect but not the demand effect, as a Þrm beneÞts from a central location
as a monopolist, and this the more the smaller ρ. Therefore, there can be agglom-
eration in equilibrium. Complete agglomeration can only occur for ρ ≤ 2/3 where
the probability of ending up in a duopoly situation is low. For ρ > 2/3, the duopoly
outcome becomes so likely that the competition effect starts to dominate and Þrms
fragment in equilibrium. Indeed, as in dAspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse, that
outcome does not depend on t.
Technological Spillovers and Patent Protection
As emphasized in the introduction, technological spillovers are often cited as one of
the main reasons why Þrms in R&D intensive industries agglomerate. It is thus worth
investigating in our model the effect spillovers have on Þrms locations. We model
spillovers the following way: If one of the Þrms innovates, but the other one does
not, the unsuccessful Þrm receives a spillover that allows it to become active with
probability σ. Solving for the equilibrium locations in the proof of Proposition 1 by
allowing for positive technological spillovers, we obtain
Corollary 1 Consider the choice of location in the Þrst stage of the game when there
are positive spillovers.
i) The optimal locations are given as
a∗ =Max
½
0,Min
½
1
2
,
1
2
−Ψ
¾¾
and b∗ = 1− a∗,
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where Ψ ≡ 3(−2+3ρ+4(1−ρ)σ)
2(6−4ρ−2(1−ρ)σ) .
ii) Technological spillovers are a deglomerating force, i.e.
∂a∗
∂σ
= −∂b
∗
∂σ
≤ 0.
Proof: See proof of Proposition 1.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward: Spillovers make it more likely
that the Þrms end up in duopoly. This strengthens the competition effect and makes
agglomeration less attractive. Suppose that these spillovers are localized in the sense
that spillovers increase with the proximity of the Þrms. An empirical example for
the geographical interpretation of the model is given by Jaffe et al. (1993). This,
however, only reinforces the deglomerating effect of spillovers. The reason is that
moving closer in product space becomes more costly marginally, as this increases
the probability that the Þrms end up in a duopoly. The model thus provides an
interesting contrasting view on the effects of spillovers to the standard argument sug-
gesting that agglomeration in R&D intensive industries is due to knowledge spillovers.
There is another interpretation for the spillover parameter. Reinterpret the inverse
of σ as the time period elapsing between marketing the original innovation, and
marketing its clone. Then, in the original model, that time period is inÞnitely long
(zero spillovers) whilst in the version of this section, it is Þnitely long and decreasing
in σ. Clearly, the innovators tendency to choose a central location increases in the
time he has monopolistic control over his innovation. Conversely, an increase in the
adoption lag with the distance from the innovators location increases the tendency
towards deglomeration.
Following the same logic, it is clear that any factor that prevents the duopoly outcome
from occurring tends to make Þrms agglomerate. The best example is probably
patent protection. If the innovators are sufficiently close, it is possible that only one
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patent would be granted. This, of course, would prevent the duopoly outcome from
occurring. We model patent protection by assuming that if both Þrms innovate, there
is a probability γ that only one of the Þrms can enter the market (the Þrms are equally
likely to be excluded from the market). Corollary 2 summarises the analysis of this
case:
Corollary 2 Consider the choice of location in the Þrst stage of the game when there
is patent protection.
i) The optimal locations are given as
a∗ =Max
½
0,Min
½
1
2
,
1
2
− Φ
¾¾
and b∗ = 1− a∗,
where Φ = 3(−2+3ρ−2γρ)
2(6−4ρ+γρ) .
ii) Patent protection is an agglomerating force, i.e.
∂a∗
∂γ
= −∂b
∗
∂γ
≥ 0.
Proof: See proof of Proposition 1.
Finally, notice that positive or negative correlation in R&D outcomes would have
an effect similar to spillovers and patent protection, respectively.2 Hence, a positive
correlation between R&D outcomes would lead to less agglomeration in equilibrium
compared to the benchmark model, and negative correlation to more.
4.4.3 Welfare
In the previous section we have derived the Þrms equilibrium locations. As discussed
in the introduction, it is important to know whether there is too much, or too little
2Yet the effects are not identical. Take the case of spillovers. With spillovers, the fact that a
Þrm fails to innovate does not contain information about the other Þrms likelihood of failing, as it
would if projects were positively correlated. A postive correlation in R&D outcomes might occur for
exogenous reasons (for example, the next step forward is evident to participants in the industry) or
might be the conscious choice of Þrms, see also Cardon and Sasaki (1998).
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agglomeration as compared to the locational choice of a hypothetical social planner.
The following two observations greatly simplify the calculation of the welfare max-
imising locations. First, having assumed that the market is always covered, we do
not need to worry about how many consumers buy the product. Second, as the con-
sumers exercise unit demand, there is no deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing.
Therefore, the welfare optimal locations are simply those that minimise consumers
expected transportation costs. The next proposition, in which we again allow for
spillovers, states the welfare maximising locations of the two Þrms.
Proposition 2 The welfare maximising locations are:
aW =Max
½
0,Min
½
1
2
,
1
2
− Ω
¾¾
and bW =Min
½
Max
½
1
2
,
1
2
+ Ω
¾
, 1
¾
,
where Ω ≡ρ+2(1−ρ)σ
4(2−ρ) .
Proof: See appendix.
In interpreting the welfare result and comparing it with the equilibrium locations
derived in proposition 1, let us Þrst concentrate on the situation without spillovers.
In stage 3 of our game, i.e. after the R&D outcomes are realised, the optimal loca-
tions depend on whether there are one or two Þrms active in the market. For the
monopolist, the welfare maximising location is 1/2. The duopolists optimal loca-
tions are a = 1
4
and b = 3
4
, respectively. These locations all minimise the welfare loss
due to transportation costs. What does this imply for the Þrms welfare maximising
locations in stage 1, i.e. before the outcomes of the R&D efforts are revealed?
Suppose Þrst that there are no spillovers between the Þrms. Let ρ, the probability
that a Þrm innovates, become very small. In this case, if there is an innovation, the
innovator will tend to be a monopolist. For ρ → 0, the optimal location is thus
a = b = 1
2
. As ρ increases, the probability that a duopoly arises increases. Therefore,
the welfare maximising locations are such that the Þrms are located symmetrically
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Figure 4.2: The equilibrium and the welfare maximising locations.
around 1
2
and with a positive distance (smaller than 1
2
) between them. Finally, for
ρ = 1 there will be a duopoly with certainty, so the welfare maximising locations are
a = 1
4
and b = 3
4
, respectively.
Comparing Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, we obtain immediately
Corollary 3 Consider the model without spillovers. There exists a unique value eρ
such that
i) ρ < eρ implies a∗ < aw (b∗ > bw)
ii) ρ > eρ implies a∗ > aw (b∗ < bw).
Figure 4.2 illustrates the welfare maximising locations (dashed) as well as the equilib-
rium locations (solid). The Þgure shows how there is excessive spatial concentration
for low ρ, and excessive spatial dispersion for high ρ.
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Figure 4.3: The regions with excessive concentration and dispersion.
Consider now the situation with positive spillovers (σ > 0). Spillovers imply that
the success of one Þrm increases the other Þrms probability of success. Compared
to the situation with no spillovers, the duopoly outcome is more likely to occur (and
monopoly less likely). Hence the social planner would opt for relatively more disper-
sion. In equilibrium, spillovers lead also to more dispersion. Figure 4.3 illustrates
how, as a result of these two effects, the region with excessive spatial concentra-
tion decreases as the technological spillovers between Þrms increase. Indeed, the line
segmenting the two regions is given by the function ρ(σ). This is summarised in
Corollary 4 There exists a monotonically declining function ρ(σ) such that for any
σ ≤ σ, ρ < ρ(σ) implies excessive concentration, whence ρ > ρ(σ) implies excessive
dispersion. For σ > σ, there is excessive dispersion for any ρ.
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4.5 Endogenous R&D Decisions
In the benchmark model, the Þrms had no choice of how to pursue their R&D ac-
tivities. In this section, we allow the Þrms to choose between two R&D strategies.
They can costlessly follow either a safe and well-known path (S ) or a riskier and
more innovative path (R). Following the safe path, the Þrm develops with certainty
a product of quality qL. If instead the Þrm follows the riskier path, it develops, with
probability ρ, a product of higher quality qH . We denote ∆ ≡ qH−qL. The outcomes
of risky R&D efforts are again uncorrelated. We assume that the Þrms can only follow
one of the paths. Hence, if a Þrm tries to develop the high quality product but fails,
it cannot switch to the low risk strategy, and thus must stay inactive ex post.
The Þrms simultaneously choose their location and R&D strategies. We already have
determined the equilibrium prices for given location and qualities, so we only have to
look for a Nash-equilibrium jointly in locations and R&D choices. We denote Þrm As
strategy by sA = (a, z), where a is the location and z ∈ {S,R} is the R&D project.
Firm Bs strategy is denoted in the same manner.
4.5.1 The Equilibrium
Our procedure for determining the equilibria in this game is as follows. In the en-
suing two lemmata, we specify the locational equilibria conditional on chosen R&D
strategies. These lemmata are used in the Þnal proposition to show that payoffs in
the equilibrium candidates, in which both R&D and locational strategies are jointly
determined, remain undominated.
Proposition 1 speciÞes the equilibrium location conditional upon Þrms both choosing
the risky R&D path. The equilibrium location of the Þrms if they choose the safe
technology is already known, so we will just state the result.
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Lemma 3 Consider a candidate equilibrium, in which both Þrms choose the safe
technology. Then, each Þrms optimal location, given any location of the other Þrm,
is the one that is furthest away from its competitors location.
Proof: See dAspremont, Gabszewicz & Thisse (1979).¥
Consider now locational equilibria conditional when one Þrm chooses the safe tech-
nology and the other the risky one. In this case the reaction functions are highly
non-linear. Towards solving the model closed form we need to make restrictions
on some parameters. The following assumption states sufficient (but not necessary)
conditions on these:
A. 2. ∆ ≥ ∆ = t and ρ ≤ 2
3
= ρ.
Assumption 2 excludes technologies that improve little on the safe technology and/or
are successful with a very high probability.
In the next lemma, we specify the relevant equilibrium locations..
Lemma 4 Let Assumption 2 hold and consider a candidate equilibrium, in which one
Þrm (say, A) chooses the safe technology while the other (B) chooses the risky one.
Then, Þrm As optimal location for any b is a = 1/2. Firm bs optimal location given
a is b = a.
Proof: See appendix.¥
The reaction functions of the two Þrms illustrate how differently they weigh the
possible outcomes. If the risky R&D project is successful, the Þrm that has chosen
the safe technology is not going to earn much proÞts no matter where it locates, as it
supplies an inferior product. Therefore, it chooses the central location, because that
maximizes its proÞts when it is alone in the market. The Þrm that chooses the risky
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R&D project only earns proÞt if it is successful. It also prefers to go to the centre
of the market, as this results in the highest possible price obtainable, whilst the low
quality Þrm is driven out of the market.
The fact that the high quality Þrm drives the low quality Þrm out of the market is a
consequence of Assumption 2 that rules out very small quality differences. However,
it is important to notice that the possibility that both Þrms stay in the market is not
ruled out by Assumption 2. From Lemma 2, it follows that if the Þrms would locate
at the opposite ends of the line, the low quality Þrm would stay in the market as long
as ∆ ≤ 3t.
Using Lemma 3 and 4 and Proposition 1, it is now possible to derive the equilibria
of the full game. We will denote the possible equilibria by{sA, sB} where the two
entries refer to Þrm As Þrm Bs strategies respectively. Abusing notation slightly,
we will denote by ΠDi (sA, sB) Þrm is expected proÞt as a function of the two Þrms
strategies.
Proposition 3 i) {(1
2
, R), (1
2
, R)} is a unique equilibrium if and only if
∆ ≥ (1− ρ)(4qL − t)
4ρ
. (4.8)
ii) {(1
2
, S), (1
2
, R)} and {(1
2
, R), (1
2
, S)} are equilibria that (modulo symmetry) are
unique if and only if
25t
144ρ
≤ ∆ ≤ (1− ρ)(4qL − t)
4ρ
. (4.9)
iii) {(0, S), (1, S)} is a unique equilibrium if and only if
∆ ≤ t
2ρ
. (4.10)
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Proof: Part i) Consider the strategy choice {(1
2
, R), (1
2
, R)}. We know from Proposi-
tion 1 that if both Þrms choose the risky technology, the unique equilibrium locations
are a = b = 1
2
under Assumption 2. Therefore, we only need to check for deviations
involving the safe technology. It follows from Lemma 4 that the optimal deviation
for Þrm A (B,respectively) would be to the strategy (1
2
, S). Therefore, that strategy
choice is an equilibrium iff. ΠDA((
1
2
, R), (1
2
, R)) ≥ ΠDA((12 , S), (12 , R)), which reduces to
equation (4.8).
Part ii) Consider instead the strategy choice {(1
2
, S), (1
2
, R)} (the analysis for {(1
2
, R),
(1
2
, S)} is analogous) It follows from Lemma 4 that if the Þrms choose different tech-
nologies, the only candidate equilibrium locations are both Þrms choosing 1
2
. Again,
we consider deviations to a different technology. Proposition 1 implies that the opti-
mal deviation for Þrm A is (1
2
, R), while Lemma 3 implies that the optimal deviation
for Þrm B is (1, S) (or, (0, S)). It follows that strategy choice is an equilibrium iff
ΠDA((
1
2
, S), (1
2
, R)) ≥ ΠDA((12 , R), (12 , R)) and if ΠDB((12 , S), (12 , R)) ≥ ΠDB((12 , S), (1, S)),
which reduce to equation (4.9), respectively.
Part iii) Consider the strategy choice {(0, S), (1, S)}. From Lemma 3 it follows that
this is the candidate equilibrium given the technology choice. Suppose that ÞrmB (or,
alternatively, A) would choose the technology R. From Lemma 4 it follows that the
optimal deviation would be to (0, R). Therefore, the strategy choice is an equilibrium
iff. ΠDA((0, S), (1, S)) ≥ ΠDA((0, S), (0, R)), which reduces to equation (4.10).¥
4.5.2 Discussion
Figure 4.4 summarises the equilibrium outcomes. For low values of both ∆ and ρ, the
expected return on the risky technology is so low that the Þrms prefer choosing the
safe technology, in which case the Þrms locate as far as possible from each other. By
contrast, if both, ∆ and ρ exhibit high values, the risky technology is more attractive.
Under Assumption 2, the Þrms thus locate together in the middle and choose the risky
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Figure 4.4: The equilibrium outcome with endogenous R&D choices.
technology. The most interesting equilibria arise for intermediate values of ∆ and ρ.
As shown in the Þgure, we Þnd equilibria where the Þrms agglomerate in the centre,
but choose different technologies. In these equilibria, the Þrms do not differentiate
themselves by choosing different horizontal characteristics, but instead by choosing
different R&D strategies which, in our model, invariably lead to differing outcomes:
one of the Þrms will dominate the market, whilst the other will remain inactive.
This result provides an interesting link to different branches of the literature. For
instance, in the literature on multi-dimensional horizontal differentiation, it has been
shown how Þrms differentiate themselves maximally in one dimension and minimally
in the other one, see Irmen and Thisse (1998). This is similar to what happens in our
model for low and intermediate values of ∆ and ρ. For low values, they differ max-
imally in locations but minimally in the vertical dimension, whilst for intermediate
values, locational differentiation is minimal and vertical differentiation is maximal.
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Yet this cannot happen for high values: Since consumers are willing to pay more
for higher quality, both Þrms differentiate minimally in space, and prefer the risky
technology if it has a high expected pay-off.
The risk-return trade-off in R&D has been studied by Dasgupta and Maskin (1987)
and Bhattacharya and Mookherjee (1986), among others. They used very general
risk-return functions. However, to make the analysis tractable, the authors restricted
their attention to symmetric R&D choices by the Þrms in the industry. In a less
general model, we demonstrate that imposing symmetry might be quite restrictive.
Indeed, our results suggest that Þrms have incentives to differentiate themselves also
along R&D dimension, in order to compete less Þercely in the product market.
The following corollary looks at the equilibrium outcome under a speciÞc subset of
the risky innovation technologies, namely all mean-preserving spreads of the safe
innovation technology.
Corollary 5 If the Þrms can choose between two technologies with the same mean
but a different spread, i.e. qL = ρqH, the equilibrium outcome under Assumption 2 is
{(1
2
, R), (1
2
, R)}.
Proof: Using qL = ρqH , we can express the quality difference as ∆ = 1−ρρ qL, which
is strictly greater than (1−ρ)(4qL−t)
4ρ
. It follows from Proposition 3 that the unique
equilibrium under Assumption 2 is {(1
2
, R), (1
2
, R)}.¥
In the Hotelling model considered here, competition between the Þrms dissipates
aggregate rents.3 However, if possible, the Þrms prefer to participate in a lottery
where they sometimes win and be alone in the market, and sometimes loose (with
the same probability) and be inactive. If both Þrms choose the risky technology,
3In most standard models of competition, like, e.g., Cournot or Bertrand competition with ho-
mogenous goods, competition destroys rents compared to a situation of monopoly. In this case, the
efficiency effect or the joint proÞt effect is said to hold.
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they are essentially partaking in such a lottery. The cost of the lottery, however, is
that if neither of the Þrms innovates, they cannot serve the market. It turns out, as
Corollary 5 shows, that the beneÞt from gambling in the technology choice outweighs
the cost if the risky technology has the same mean quality as the safe one.
4.5.3 Welfare
Let us now assess the welfare properties of the equilibrium derived in the previous
section. In order to Þnd the welfare maximising pairs of locations and innovation tech-
nologies for both Þrms, we will proceed as follows. First, we will derive the socially
efficient locations for all three possible innovation patterns in the industry. Then,
we will compare the attainable welfare levels under these innovation patterns given
optimal locations and determine the global maximum. And Þnally, we compare these
results with the equilibrium outcome.
Suppose Þrst that both Þrms were to employ the risky technology. Then the results of
Proposition 2 apply. The corresponding expected welfare level for these locations is
derived in the appendix. Second, if both Þrms are given the safe technology, then, as
argued in the benchmark model, the transportation costs are minimised and welfare
maximised for a = 1
4
and b = 3
4
.
The last possibility is that one Þrm chooses the risky R&D strategy and the other the
safe one. Here, we need to take into account not only the transportation costs, but
also the quality of the products bought by the consumers. Assumption 2 implies that
no matter how far the Þrms are located from each other, it is welfare maximising that
all consumers buy the high quality product whenever it is developed. This is so, as, by
Assumption 2 the maximal travelling cost (t) is lower than the quality difference (∆).
The welfare maximising locations are thus a = b = 1
2
because this ensures that the
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Þrm with the highest available quality serves the whole market at the lowest possible
transportation cost. This is shown formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds and that one Þrm is endowed with the
safe technology and the other with the risky one. Then the welfare maximising loca-
tions are a=b=1
2
.
Proof: See appendix.
We are now in the position to compare the welfare outcomes under the different
technology choices and corresponding optimal locations of Þrms. The next proposition
states the main welfare result. DeÞne
∆W1 ≡
t
16ρ
and ∆W2 ≡
1− ρ
ρ
qL +
t(ρ3 − 16ρ2 + 20ρ− 8)
48t(1− ρ)(2− ρ) ,
then
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then the welfare maximising
strategies {sWA , sWB } are
{sWA , sWB } =

{(1
4
, S), (3
4
, S)} for 0 < ∆ ≤ ∆W1 ,
{(1
2
, S), (1
2
, R)} and {(1
2
, R), (1
2
, S)} for ∆W1 < ∆ ≤ ∆W2 ,
{(aW , R), (bW , R)} for ∆ > ∆W2 .
where aW and bW are as in Proposition 2.
Proof: See appendix.
The welfare maximising technology and location choice is illustrated in Figure 4.5.
First, for low values of ∆ and % where the expected return of risky R&D strategy is
low, it is optimal that both Þrms choose the safe technology. In order to minimise
the transportation costs, the Þrms should then locate at 1
4
and 3
4
. For intermediate
values of ∆ and %, it is optimal that one Þrm tries to develop the high quality product
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while the other Þrm develops the safe, low quality product that is then available if
the risky R&D strategy fails. Here, as discussed above, the optimal locations are
a = b = 1
2
. Finally, if ∆ and % are high, the risky technology is so attractive that
both Þrms should choose it from point view of welfare. The optimal locations are
then symmetric around 1
2
and situated between 1
4
and 3
4
as discussed in section 4.
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Figure 4.5: Welfare properties of the equilibrium.
Finally, the last corollary compares the socially efficient allocation with the equilib-
rium outcome.
Corollary 6 Comparing Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, we get
(i) If 0 < ∆ ≤ ∆W1 , Þrms excessively differentiate in product space but the optimal
innovation techniques.
(ii) If ∆W1 < ∆ ≤ t2ρ , Þrms excessively differentiate in product space and one Þrm
inadequately chooses the safe production strategy.
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(iii) If 25
144ρ
< ∆ ≤ (1−ρ)(4qL−t)
4ρ
, Þrms choose the welfare maximizing allocation.
(iv) If (1−ρ)(4qL−t)
4ρ
< ∆ ≤ ∆W2 , Þrms choose optimal locations but one Þrm inade-
quately adopts the risky innovation strategy.
(v) If ∆ > ∆W2 , Þrms excessively concentrate in product space but select the optimal
innovation techniques.
Figure 4.5 shows that for low values of ∆ and % (point (i) and (ii) in the corollary),
the Þrms adopt the safe technology and differentiate themselves in the horizontal
dimension. In equilibrium, there is too much horizontal differentiation given the safe
technology choice. Furthermore, there is a region, described in point (ii), where there
is too little R&D differentiation. For intermediate values ∆ and % (point (iii)), the
Þrms choose the optimal location as well as technology. For high values of ∆ and
% (point (v)), the Þrms adopt the risky technology, which is the welfare maximising
choice. However, when choosing their location the Þrms put too much weight on
the monopoly outcome relative to duopoly. The reason is that the Þrms extract all
social surplus under monopoly but not under duopoly. Therefore, there is too little
horizontal differentiation in equilibrium, as the Þrms agglomerate in the middle (the
optimal location under monopoly). Finally, there is a small region where the Þrms
choose the optimal horizontal product characteristics, but end up with too much R&D
differentiation (point (iv)).
4.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyse the interaction between Þrms R&D decisions and their loca-
tion choices in product or geographical space which have not been analysed heretofore.
In a benchmark model, we introduce stochastic R&D in the classical Hotelling model
and show that this might restore the principle of minimum differentiation even in a
model with quadratic transportation costs of consumers. The intuition for this result
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is that if R&D success is stochastic, a Þrm only meets a competitor in the product
market with a certain probability and this weakens the centrifugal competition effect
that normally dominates the centripetal demand effect in the Hotelling model.
ModiÞcations of the model to include R&D spillovers or patenting show clearly that
spillovers exercise a deglomerating and patents an agglomerating effect. The reason
is that spillovers align the Þrms R&D successes and make them more competitive
when they are close to each other. Whereas patent protection lead one of the Þrms
to win, at the cost of the other which decreases the competitive pressure.
In the second part of the paper, we combine locational choices of Þrms with an
endogenisation of their R&D technologies in the sense that they can choose between
riskless production of a low quality good or a risky development of a high quality
good. Our results hint at a strong complementarity between risk taking in R&D and
clustering in product or geographical space. We Þnd three different types of equilibria:
(i) Þrms stay apart from each other and choose the safe innovation technology, (ii)
they cluster in the center and choose the risky technology or (iii) they cluster in the
center and differentiate themselves along the R&D dimension.
As far as welfare comparisons is concerned, we obtain excessive dispersion (yet com-
pliance with the welfare allocation with respect to the chosen R&D technique) for low
quality differences, and similarly excessive concentration for high quality differences.
For intermediate differences, we obtain either the welfare result or deviations with
respect to the chosen R&D strategy.
There is an utterly clear labor market interpretation for the model results for the case
where both Þrms choose to agglomerate whilst employing the risky R&D technology:
Firms agglomerate to share the same (large) labor market when chances are high that
only one of the two Þrms (at a time) beneÞts from it. To us, this most clearly reßects
the hearsay about Silicon valley dynamics. According to that, Þrms come and go,
labor stays.
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It remains to speculate about possible extensions of the model. A particularly inter-
esting, yet difficult one seems to be to consider that Þrms produce several products
and compete only in a subset of these, yet beneÞt from a central location in two
ways. First, from participation in a large output (or labor) market; and second, from
shared knowledge that helps improving also on the product lines in which they dont
compete.
Another interesting extension, especially within the geographical interpretation of
the model would be to explicitly account for the localized cumulative effects of R&D.
Empirical research suggests that knowledge seems not to spread as easily as one would
expect. It is not only embedded in human beings, but also in, possibly informal,
institutions. It seems that this feature also enhances the spatial concentration of
Þrms in R&D intensive industries. Yet, as usual, this, as well as other potential
extensions of our model, must be left for further consideration.
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4.8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
The demand of Þrm A can is given as
ey =Max½0,Min½a+ b
2
− epA − epB
2t(b− a) , 1
¾¾
,
where epi = qi−pi is the quality adjusted price of Þrm i. We know from dAspremont,
Gabszewicz & Thisse (1979) that ey is continuous in (epA, epB), so it follows immediately
that it is also continuous in (pA, pB). Quality differences do thus not create problems
for the existence of a price equilibrium.
DeÞne pA ≡ pB + qA − qB + (b2 − a2)t and pA ≡ pB + qA − qB − (b − a)(2− a − b).
The proÞt function of Þrm A (for given a, b, qA, and qB) can be written as:
ΠDA(pA, pB) =

0 for pA > pA
pA
³
a+b
2
− pA−pB
2t(b−a)
´
for pA ≥ pA ≥ pA
pA 0 ≤ pA < pA.
It is easy to verify that ΠDA(pA, pB) is continuous in pA. Furthermore, Π
D
A(pA, pB)
consists of concave segments and the left hand side derivative (LHS) at p
A
is larger
than the right hand side (RHS) derivative. Therefore, ΠDA(pA, pB) is concave for
pA ≤ pA, so whenever the exists an optimal price, p∗A, such that ΠDA (p∗A, pB) > 0, p∗A
is unique. The proÞt function of Þrm B is derived analogously. Suppose Þrst that
there exists an interior solution where both Þrms have a positive market share. The
Þrst order conditions of the two Þrms are given as:
∂ΠDA(pA, pB)
∂pA
=
a+ b
2
− 2pA − pB − qA + qB
2(b− a)t = 0
∂ΠDB(pA, pB)
∂pB
= (1− a+ b
2
)− 2pB − pA − qB + qA
2(b− a)t = 0.
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Solving for (pA, pB), we obtain (4.3). We need to check for corner solutions. Take
the case of qA − qB > t(b − a)(4 − a − b). We will now verify that prices given by
(4.4) constitute an equilibrium. For Þrm A, the LHS derivative at p
A
is 1, while the
RHS derivative is ∂Π
D
A (pA,pB)
∂pA
|(pA,pB)=(pA,0)< 0. Hence, the optimal price is p∗A = pA =
qA− qB − t(b− a)(4− a− b). For Þrm B, pB < 0, so Þrm B earns zero proÞts. Thus,
p∗B = 0 is an optimal price. The other corner solution, given by (4.2), can be veriÞed
in a similar way. Finally, it can be shown that under the assumption pA, pB ≥ 0, the
price equilibrium is unique.¥
Proof of Proposition 1
We we will here solve the model allowing for spillovers. If there are spillovers, the
proÞt of Þrm A is given as:
E(ΠA(a, b, qA, qB, ρ)) = ρ(ρ(1− σ)ΠDA(a, b, 0) + (1− ρ(1− σ))ΠM(q, a)).
Solving the Þrst-order condition, and excluding solutions that do not satisfy 0 ≤ a ≤
1, we obtain the reaction function:
RA(b) =
(−36− 4 (−5 + b) σ − ρ (−28 + 2b+ 20σ − 4bσ) +√V +W )
6ρ+ 12 (1− ρ) σ ,
where
V := (36 + 2 (−14 + b) ρ− 4 (5− b) (1− ρ) σ)2
and
W := 4 (3ρ+ 6 (1− ρ)σ) ¡36− 40ρ+ b2ρ− 2 ¡22− b2¢ (1− ρ) σ¢
.
Deriving the reaction function of Þrm B, we have:
RB(a) =
36− 4 (1 + a)σ − 2ρ (10 + a− 2 (1 + a)σ)−√X − Y
6ρ+ 12 (1− ρ)σ ,
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where
X := (36− 2 (10 + a) ρ− 4 (1 + a) (1− ρ)σ)2
and
Y := 12
¡
16− a2¢ (ρ+ 2σ − 2ρσ)2
.
It can be veriÞed that RB(1 − x) = 1 − RA(x). Using the symmetry, we solve
RA(b) = 1− b and RB(a) = 1− a for (a, b), which proves Corollary 1. Proposition 1
follows directly by setting σ = 0. Corollary 2 is proved in a similar way.¥
Proof of Lemma 4
We will without loss of generality focus on situations where a ≤ b and Þrm A has
chosen the safe technology and Þrm B the risky.
The reaction function of Þrm A
>From equation (4.7) it follows that Þrm A is driven out the market when Þrm B
innovates iff. t(b− a)(2+ a+ b)−∆ ≤ 0. Therefore, there exists a value of a, a, such
that Firm A stays in the market if Firm B innovates iff. a ≤ a. a is gives as:
a ≡Max
(
0,−1 +
p
(1 + b)2t−∆√
t
)
.
Using equation (4.7), the proÞt function of Þrm A can be written as:
ΠDA((a, S), (b,R) = ρ
(t(b−a)(2+a+b)−∆)2
18t(b−a) + (1− ρ)(qL − t(Max{a, 1− a})2) for a ≤ a
(1− ρ)(qL − t(Max{a, 1− a})2) for a > a.
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Case 1: a = 0
Maximizing the proÞts wrt. a yields:
∂ΠDA((a, S), (b, R))
∂a
=
 2(1− ρ)(1− a)t for a ≤ 12 .−2(1− ρ)at for a > 1
2
.
(4.11)
It follows that the optimal location is a∗ = 1
2
.
Case 2: 0 < a ≤ 1
2
It follows from (4.11) that the ΠDA((a, S), (b, R)) is increasing for
1
2
≥ a > a and
decreasing after 1
2
. We now look at a ≤ a. Maximizing the proÞts wrt. a yields:
∂ΠDA((a, S), (b,R))
∂a
=
1
18
Ã
−2 (∆) ρ+ (∆)
2ρ
(a− b)2t −
¡
36 (−1 + a) + ¡40 + 3a2 + 2a (−14 + b)− b2¢ ρ¢ t!
We have that
∂2ΠDA((a, S), (b, R))
∂a∂b
=
tρ
9
µ
(b− a)− 1
(b− a)3
¶
< 0.
This implies that ∂Π
D
A ((a,S),(b,R))
∂a
≥ ∂ΠDA ((a,S),(1,R))
∂a
for all (a, b). We want to show that
∂ΠDA ((a,S),(b,R))
∂a
≥ 0 and it is thus sufficient to show that ∂ΠDA ((a,S),(1,R))
∂a
≥ 0 for all a ≤ a.
As a Þrst step, we look at the ∂Π
D
A ((a,S),(1,R))
∂a
evaluated at a = 0. From Assumption 2
it follows that
∂ΠDA((0, S), (1, R))
∂a
=
1
18
µ
−2∆ρ+ ∆
2ρ
t
+ (36− 39ρ) t
¶
≥ 0.
Second, we show that ∂Π
D
A ((a,S),(1,R))
∂a
is positive at a = 1
2
(the maximal value of a).
Straight forward calculations show that ∂Π
D
A ((
1
2
,S),(1,R))
∂a
is positive if Assumption 2
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holds:
∂ΠDA((
1
2
, S), (1, R))
∂a
=
1
18
µ
−2∆ρ+ 4∆
2ρ
t
+
µ
18− 107ρ
4
¶
t
¶
≥ 0.
We have now shown that ∂Π
D
A ((a,S),(1,R))
∂a
is positive at the minimal and the maximal
value of a. What is left to show is that ∂Π
D
A ((a,S),(1,R))
∂a
cannot take on negative values
between 0 and 1
2
. We show this in two steps: First, we show that ∂
2ΠDA ((
1
2
,S),(1,R))
∂a2
is
negative at a = 0 and a = 1
2
. Afterwards, we show that ∂Π
D
A ((
1
2
,S),(1,R))
∂a
is convex,
i.e. ∂
3ΠDA ((
1
2
,S),(1,R))
∂a3
≥ 0. This imply that the Þrst order condition is positive for all
0 ≤ a ≤ 1
2
.
We have:
∂2ΠDA((0, S), (1, R))
∂a2
= −2
9
(9− 7ρ) < 0 and
∂2ΠDA((
1
2
, S), (1, R))
∂a2
= (−2 + 13
6
ρ) < 0,
where ∂
2ΠDA ((
1
2
,S),(1,R))
∂a2
< 0 holds because of Assumption 2. Finally, using Assumption
2, we have:
∂3ΠDA((a, S), (1, R))
∂a3
=
ρ
3
µ
∆2
t(b− a)4 − t
¶
> 0.
Hence, we conclude that if a ≤ 1
2
, the Þrst order condition is positive for all a ≤ 1
2
and negative for 1
2
< a ≤ b. It follows that a∗ = 1
2
.
Case 3: a > 1
2
It follows from the analysis of Case 2 that the Þrst order condition is positive for
a ≤ 1
2
. Consider now 1
2
< a ≤ a < b. Here, the Þrst order condition is given as
∂ΠDA((a, S), (b,R))
∂a
=
ρ(∆− t(b− a)(2 + a+ b)t)(∆+ t(b− a)(2 + 3a− b)t)
18(b− a)2 + (−2(1− ρ)at) < 0.
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It follows form the analysis of Case 1 that ∂Π
D
A ((a,S),(1,R))
∂a
< 0 for a < a ≤ b. Hence,
a∗ = 1
2
. This proves part i) of Lemma 4.
The reaction function of Þrm B
If Þrm B innovates, it drives Þrm A out the market t(b − a)(2 + a + b) − ∆ ≤ 0.
Therefore, there exists a value of b, b, such that Firm A stays in the market if Firm
B innovates iff. b ≥ b. b is gives as:
b ≡Min
(
1,−1 +
p
(1 + a)2t+∆√
t
)
.
Using equation (4.7), the proÞt function of Þrm B can be written as:
ΠDB((a, S), (b,R) =
 ρ(∆− t(b2 − a2)) for b ≤ bρ (t(b−a)(4−a−b)−∆)2
18t(b−a) for b > b.
First, we consider the consider the case of b ≤ b. Here, we have
∂ΠDB((a, S), (b, R))
∂b
= −2ρbt < 0 for b ≤ b.
Next, we consider b > b:
∂ΠDB((a, S), (b,R))
∂b
=
− ρ(∆− (b− a)(4 + a− 3b)t)(∆+ (b− a)(4− a− b)t)
18(b− a)2 for b > b.
As a Þrst step, we show that this function is convex in the relevant range.
∂2ΠDB((a, S), (b,R))
∂b2
= ρ
³
− ∆2
(a−b)3 − t(8− a− 3b)t2
´
9t
It can be shown that the ∂
3ΠDB ((a,S),(b,R))
∂b3
> 0. Hence, in order to show that the
function is convex, it is enough to show that it is convex at the lowest possible value
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of b, b. Calculations show that ∂
3ΠDB ((a,S),(b,R))
∂b2∂a
|b=b> 0 under Assumption 2. To show
convexity, it is thus sufficient to show that ∂
2ΠDB ((a,S),(b,R))
∂b2
|(a,b)=(0,b)> 0. We have that
∂2ΠDB((a, S), (b, R))
∂b2
|(a,b)=(0,b)=
4ρ
9∆
³
t(t− 2∆) +√t(t+∆)3/2
´
.
Analysis of this function shows that it has a global minimum at ∆ = 3t where it takes
on the value 4ρt
9
. Hence, we have
∂2ΠDB ((a,S),(b,R))
∂b2
>
∂2ΠDB ((a,S),(b,R))
∂b2
|(a,b)=(0,b)> 0 for (a, b) in the relevant range, so the
ΠDB((a, S), (b,R)) is convex. In order to show that
∂ΠDB ((a,S),(b,R))
∂b
< 0 for all b > b, it
is thus enough to show that ∂Π
D
B ((a,S),(b,R))
∂b
|b=1< 0. We have that
∂2ΠDB((a, S), (1, R))
∂b∂∆
< 0.
Hence, the Þrst order condition is maximized for the minimal value of ∆. Under
Assumption 2, this is ∆ = t. Therefore, we have
∂ΠDB((a, S), (1, R))
∂b
<
∂ΠDB((a, S), (1, R))
∂b
|∆=t= −(−2 + a)
2a2ρt
18(1− a)2 < 0.
We conclude that ∂Π
D
B ((a,S),(b,R))
∂b
< 0 for all b > b. Hence, the ∂Π
D
B ((a,S),(b,R))
∂b
< 0 for
all b ≥ a, so b∗ = a. This proves part ii) of Lemma 4.¥
Proof of Proposition 2
Total welfare in a monopoly where a Þrm offers a product of quality q at location a,
0 ≤ a ≤ 1 is given by
WM :=
1Z
0
(q − t(y − a)2)dy = q − t
2
+ at(1− a).
In a duopoly with Þrms located at a and b, 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1 and offering a product of
quality q, welfare is
WD : =
2+a+b
6Z
0
(q − t(a− y)2)dy +
1Z
2+a+b
6
(q − t(b− y)2)dy
= q − t
3
+ bt(1− b) + t
36
(b− a)(2 + a+ b)(5b+ 5a− 2).
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Expected welfare in the economy, EW (a, b), is then deÞned as
EW (a, b) := ρ2WD + ρ(1− ρ)WM(a) + (1− ρ)ρWM(b).
Taking the Þrst derivatives of this function with respect to the locations a and b yields
the following two necessary conditions:
(4− a (16 + 15 a)− 10 a b+ 5 b2) ρ2 t
36
+ (1− 2 a) (1− ρ) ρq = 0
and
(32− 56 b+ 5 (a+ b) (−a+ 3 b)) ρ2 t
36
+ (1− 2 b) (1− ρ) ρq = 0.
These conditions are also sufficient for a maximum since
∂2EW (a, b)
∂a2
=
− ((8 + 15 a+ 5 b) ρ2 t)
18
− 2 (1− ρ) ρ q < 0
and
∂2EW (a, b)
∂b2
= −2 q (1− ρ) ρ− (28− 5 a− 15 b) ρ
2 t
18
< 0.
Thus, solving the two Þrst order conditions above for (a, b) yields the welfare max-
imising locations given in the proposition.¥
Proof of Lemma 5
We assume as in the proof of Lemma 4 that Þrm A chooses the safe technology and
Þrm B the risky. a and b are deÞned in Lemma 4. If Þrm A is alone in the market,
the welfare under Assumption 1 is given as:
WMA (a) =
1Z
0
¡
qL − t(a− x)2
¢
dx = qL − t
3
+ at(1− a).
If Þrm B innovates and b ≥ b, so Þrm A stays active in the market, the welfare is
given as:
WDA,B(a, b) =
eyZ
0
¡
qL − t(a− x)2
¢
dx+
1Z
ey
¡
qH − t(b− x)2
¢
dx
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where ey is given by 4.1. Integrating this expression, we obtain:
WDA,B(a, b) =
1
36
(2 (4 + 5a+ 5b) qL + 28qH − 10 (a+ b) qH − 5(qL − qH)
2
(a− b) t −¡
12 + 5a3 − (−4 + b) b (−8 + 5b) + a2 (8 + 5b)− a4 + 5b2)¢ t).
Finally, if Þrm B innovates, and b < b, the expected welfare is given by:
WDB (b) =
1Z
0
¡
qH − t(b− x)2
¢
dx = qH − t
3
+ bt(1− b).
The expected ex-ante welfare is then given as:
E(W (a, b)) =
 ρWDA,B(a, b) + (1− ρ)WMA (a) if b ≥ bρWDB (b) + (1− ρ)WMA (a) if b < b.
We Þrst the optimal location of Þrm B. It is easily shown that for b < b, E(W (a, b))
is maximized for b = Min{1/2, b}. Consider now b ≥ b. The Þrst-order condition
wrt. to b is given as:
∂E(W (a, b))
∂b
=
r
36
µ
(32− 56b− 5 (a− 3b) (a+ b)) t− 10∆− 5∆
2
(a− b)2t
¶
.
We want to show that ∂E(W (a,b))
∂b
< 0 in the relevant area. Since ∂
2E(W (a,b))
∂b∂a
, ∂
2E(W (a,b))
∂b∂∆
<
0, ∂E(W (a,b))
∂b
takes on the highest value for the lowest admissible values of ∆ and a:
∆ = t and a = 0. Plugging these values into the Þrst-order condition, we obtain:
∂E(W (0, b))
∂b
=
rt
36b2
¡−5 + b2 (22 + b (−56 + 15b))¢
In order to Þnd the maximal value of ∂E(W (0,b))
∂b
, we solve:
∂2E(W (0, b))
∂b2
=
(5 + b3 (−28 + 15b)) rt
18b3
= 0.
We Þnd that there is only one extremum in [0, 1] at b ≈ 0, 6494. Furthermore, as
∂3E(W (0,b))
∂b3
< 0, this is a maximum. Finally, we show that ∂E(W (0,b))
∂b
|b=0,6494< 0.
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Hence, ∂E(W (a,b))
∂b
< 0 for all (a, b) st. b ≥ b. It follows that the optimal b is given by
b∗ =Min{1/2, b}.
b =Min{1/2, b} implies that Þrm A is out of the market whenever Þrm B innovates.
This implies readily that a∗ = 1
2
. Finally, a∗ = 1
2
implies that 1
2
< b, so b∗ = 1
2
.¥
Proof of Proposition 4
Expected welfare if both Þrms have the safe technology and are located at 1
4
and 3
4
,
respectively is denoted by WSS and equals
WSS = qL − t
48
.
If both Þrms adopt the risky technology and locate as stated in Proposition 2 at
(aW , bW ), the expected welfare, WRR, is given by
WRR = (qL +∆)ρ(2− ρ)− ρt
48(2− ρ)(16(1− ρ) + ρ
2) .
Finally, if Þrms have different innovation technologies and are located at the center
of the line, we get
WRS = qL + ρ∆− t
12
.
>From this, if follows that
WRR > WSS ⇐⇒ ∆ > ∆W3 :=
qL(1− ρ)2
(2− ρ)ρ −
(1− ρ)(2− (15− ρ)ρ)t
48(2− ρ)2ρ
and that
WRS > WSS ⇐⇒ ∆ > ∆W1
and Þnally
WRR > WRS ⇐⇒ ∆ > ∆W2 .
We will now proceed by showing that under our assumptions A.1. and A.2., the
ranking of these threshold values is unambiguous. First, notice that the following
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ordering holds. If qL > eqL := (14−29ρ+19ρ2−ρ3)t48(2−ρ)(1−ρ) , then ∆W1 < ∆W3 < ∆W2 , otherwise we
have ∆W2 < ∆
W
3 < ∆
W
1 . Verify that eqL is increasing in ρ. Further check that eqL is
smaller than 3t as long as ρ < 0.8756. Hence, we have that for all parameter values
that satisfy A.1. and A.2., the ranking is ∆W1 < ∆
W
3 < ∆
W
2 . This means that if
WRR > WRS, then it also holds that WRR > WSS. And, from WSS > WRS it follows
that WSS > WRR. We thus get the result stated in Proposition 4.¥
